Morrow v. Fleegle
2:21-cv-05193
| S.D. Ohio | Nov 12, 2021Background
- Plaintiff Michael Morrow, an Ohio inmate proceeding pro se, filed a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action against Muskingum County Judge Mark C. Fleegle, Assistant Prosecutor John Liddle, appointed defense attorney Keith Edwards, and Tamas Tabor.
- Allegations: Judge Fleegle recused himself after holding Morrow in contempt for refusing a plea; Fleegle waived Morrow’s speedy-trial rights without permission; appointed counsel Edwards allegedly misadvised Morrow about being a “sovereign” and misapplied federal law; no factual allegations against Tabor.
- Morrow seeks monetary damages (individual capacity) and injunctive relief for unspecified violations of federal law and constitutional rights.
- The Magistrate Judge conducted an initial screening under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A and granted Morrow’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis while directing partial filing-fee collection under § 1915(b).
- The Magistrate Judge determined that Defendants Fleegle and Liddle are protected by absolute immunity for acts within their official duties, and recommended dismissal of Morrow’s federal claims under § 1915(e)(2).
- The Magistrate Judge recommended declining supplemental jurisdiction over any state-law malpractice claim against Edwards under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3) and recommended dismissal of claims against Tabor for lack of allegations.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Immunity for judge/prosecutor | Fleegle and Liddle violated Morrow’s constitutional rights (contempt, forced plea, waiver of speedy trial) | Judges and prosecutors are absolutely immune for actions within judicial/prosecutorial duties | Claims against Fleegle and Liddle dismissed under § 1915(e)(2) (absolute immunity) |
| Federal claim against appointed counsel | Edwards gave constitutionally inadequate/advisory legal advice (sovereign theory, federal law) | Private/state-appointed counsel’s conduct is not a § 1983 claim; if malpractice, it is state law | Federal claims fail; court recommends declining supplemental jurisdiction over state malpractice claims and dismissing them without prejudice under § 1367(c)(3) |
| Claims against Tabor | (No allegations pled) | No factual basis to proceed | Dismissed under § 1915(e)(2) for failure to state a claim |
| Pleading sufficiency / IFP screening | Complaint asserts constitutional violations and seeks damages/injunction | Complaint is conclusory, lacks factual detail, and immunity bars relief | Complaint fails to state a plausible federal claim; recommended dismissal under § 1915(e)(2) |
Key Cases Cited
- Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25 (1992) (IFP statute permits dismissal of frivolous claims)
- Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319 (1989) (standards for dismissing frivolous pro se complaints)
- McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601 (6th Cir. 1997) (procedures for fee collection and IFP prisoner suits)
- Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468 (6th Cir. 2010) (apply Rule 12(b)(6) standards to § 1915A/§ 1915(e) screening)
- Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) (pleading must state a plausible claim; legal conclusions not assumed true)
- Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) (requirement of factual plausibility in complaints)
- Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967) (judicial and quasi-judicial absolute immunity principles)
- Imber v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (1976) (absolute prosecutorial immunity for prosecutorial acts within scope)
- Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9 (1991) (judicial immunity applies unless actions are nonjudicial or taken in absence of all jurisdiction)
- Brooks v. Rothe, 577 F.3d 701 (6th Cir. 2009) (when federal claims are dismissed pretrial, state-law claims generally should be dismissed as well)