Morgan, Dewan
PD-0758-15
Tex.Nov 9, 2015Background
- Dewan Morgan lived with Regina Raglin in her apartment; Raglin paid rent, Morgan had a key, paid some household bills, stored belongings, and slept there.
- On June 20, 2013, after an earlier argument that day, Raglin deadbolted and refused to let Morgan in; Morgan tried his key, rang the bell, threw rocks through a window, then kicked in the door and assaulted Raglin.
- Police initially arrested Morgan for assault-family-violence; officers believed Morgan lived at the apartment and did not arrest for burglary.
- The charge was later changed to burglary of a habitation; Morgan was convicted and sentenced to 12 years.
- The Second Court of Appeals concluded the evidence was legally insufficient to support burglary, vacated that conviction, and affirmed guilt only for the lesser-included assault; the State sought review to the Court of Criminal Appeals.
Issues
| Issue | State's Argument | Morgan's Argument | Held (Second Court of Appeals view) |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether courts must look to property/common law when construing "owner" in the Penal Code's burglary-of-habitation statute | Penal Code definition controls; "owner" should be applied in criminal-context without importing external property-law constructs | Penal Code definition is ambiguous when multiple occupants exist; Code Construction Act permits consulting property law/common law to avoid absurd results; Morgan qualifies as an "owner" or tenant | Courts may consult other laws where statutory text is ambiguous or yields absurd results; on these facts Morgan was effectively a co-occupant/tenant and entitled to challenge burglary element |
| How long after revocation of consent must elapse before forcible entry by a live-in co-occupant is burglary (i.e., was consensual right to enter terminated) | Once owner with greater right to possession effectively revokes consent, subsequent forcible entry can be burglary—possession status must be determined prior to the forcible entry | Raglin’s mere temporary locking of the deadbolt did not communicate permanent revocation; Morgan’s consensual occupancy had not been lawfully terminated, so his entry (although forcible) did not satisfy burglary element of entry without effective consent | No set time rule; revocation requires more than temporary locking or non-answering—here there was no evidence Raglin permanently revoked consent, so burglary element (absence of owner’s consent) was not proved |
Key Cases Cited
- Boykin v. State, 818 S.W.2d 782 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991) (statutory text controls over extratextual aids unless ambiguity or absurdity warrants consultation of other law)
- Azeez v. State, 248 S.W.3d 182 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008) (court may consult Code Construction Act and other law when statutory terms are ambiguous)
- Lanford v. Fourteenth Court of Appeals, 847 S.W.2d 581 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993) (ambiguity exists when parties advance polarized statutory interpretations)
- Black v. State, 505 S.W.2d 821 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974) (a tenant may possess ownership-like interests for purposes of criminal statutes)
- Porter v. State, 873 S.W.2d 729 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1994) (constructive possession and power to control can establish possession for criminal purposes)
- Krause v. State, 243 S.W.3d 95 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2007) (person living in a dwelling may be treated as an owner/occupant even if others assert title)
- Dominguez v. State, 355 S.W.3d 918 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2011) (possession/authority to enter should be assessed as of the time immediately prior to the alleged break-in)
- Mack v. State, 928 S.W.2d 219 (Tex. App.—Austin 1996) (greater right of possession doctrine considers realized rights as of the date of the offense)