MORGAN COUNTY v. MAY (And Vice Versa)
305 Ga. 305
Ga.2019Background
- Christine May built a lake house in Morgan County and began renting it for short vacation stays (about a week) starting in 2008.
- The County’s pre-2010 zoning ordinance did not mention rental duration for single-family detached dwellings; in practice the County treated <30-day rentals as prohibited and ≥30-day rentals as permitted.
- In October 2010 Morgan County amended the ordinance to expressly ban most short-term rentals defined as fewer than 30 consecutive days.
- After May rented her house for seven nights in August 2011, the County issued a criminal citation under the amended ordinance; parallel civil litigation over the ordinance ensued for years.
- The trial court later concluded the old (pre-2010) ordinance was unconstitutionally vague as applied to seven-night rentals, held that May’s prior use was grandfathered, and dismissed the criminal citation; the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (May) | Defendant's Argument (Morgan County) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the pre-2010 ordinance gave fair notice that seven-night rentals were prohibited (vagueness as applied) | Old ordinance was silent on rental duration, so May could not reasonably know week-long rentals were forbidden; therefore her use was lawful and grandfathered | The ordinance’s allowance of “single-family detached dwellings” (defined as designed or used exclusively for residential purposes) and reliance on common/dictionary definitions of "residence" put ordinary persons on notice that short-term rentals were not allowed | The court held the old ordinance was unconstitutionally vague as applied to seven-night rentals and did not put May on notice that such rentals were prohibited; her use was grandfathered |
| Whether the County’s practice or testimony about enforcement cures the ordinance’s vagueness | Practice cannot substitute for clear ordinance text; May relied on the ordinance’s silence | County contended its consistent practice (prohibiting <30-day rentals) informed property owners | Held against County: enforcement practice did not supply the statutory specificity required by due process |
| Whether definitions and dictionary meanings establish a 30-day dividing line for residence | May argued dictionary definitions and the ordinance’s text do not support a 30-day bright-line rule | County argued the definition of dwelling/residence (customary meaning) implies short stays are temporary and thus not permitted | Rejected: common definitions do not suggest 30 days is the threshold; residency can be established in one day and can fail after >30 days depending on intent |
| Whether the amended ordinance could apply retroactively to terminate a preexisting use (nonconforming use/grandfathering) | May argued a lawful preexisting use cannot be eliminated retroactively; if old ordinance allowed the rentals, they are protected nonconforming uses | County argued the amended ban applied and May could be prosecuted | Held for May: because the old ordinance did not prohibit the use, May’s short-term rental use was grandfathered and the amended ban could not be applied to her property |
Key Cases Cited
- Parker v. City of Glennville, 288 Ga. 34 (2010) (vagueness standard for ordinances not implicating First Amendment freedoms)
- Haugen v. Henry County, 277 Ga. 743 (2004) (interpretation of “or” in regulatory definitions)
- Dozier v. Baker, 283 Ga. 543 (2008) (no definite time period is essential to establish residence)
- Conrad v. Conrad, 278 Ga. 107 (2004) (residence requires both act and intent)
- Rockdale County v. Burdette, 278 Ga. 755 (2004) (protected/nonconforming uses and their preservation)
- BBC Land & Dev. v. Butts County, 281 Ga. 472 (2007) (distinguishing nonconforming uses from vested rights)
- May v. Morgan County, 343 Ga. App. 255 (2017) (procedural history and prior appellate consideration of the dispute)