Moore v. State, 34 A.3d 513

Moore was convicted of illegal possession of a regulated firearm by a disqualified person under §5-133(c) based on a .32 caliber revolver found under his bed during a Baltimore County police search.
The handgun was defective; a firearms examiner testified it was safe to test-fire after repairs, and it would fire.
Moore had a prior disqualifying conviction for possession with intent to distribute cocaine in 2005.
The circuit court denied Moore’s motions challenging operability as a prerequisite for §5-133(c) conviction and admitted the agreed statement of facts.
The Court of Special Appeals affirmed, holding that a firearm as defined in §5-101(h) does not require operability under §5-133(c).
The Maryland Court of Appeals granted review to decide whether operability is required to sustain a §5-133(c) conviction and whether the evidence proved operability in the case.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Does §5-101(h) require operability to be a “firearm” for §5-133(c)?	Moore: operability is required by plain language and Howell precedent.	State: no operability requirement; definition mirrors federal law.	Operability not required; firearm includes inoperable weapons.
Is the operability issue controlled by Howell or by the plain statutory text and history?	Moore relies on Howell to require operability.	State relies on plain meaning and legislative history aligning with federal law.	Using plain meaning and legislative history, operability is not required.
Does the inclusion of “frame or receiver” in §5-101(h)(1)(ii) imply non-operable components can be a firearm?	Moore argues frame/receiver alone is not a firearm.	State argues frame/receiver is within the firearm definition.	Frame/receiver does not mandate operability; it is within the firearm definition.
Should Maryland’s Howell definition of firearm govern §5-133(c) despite later codification?	Moore says Howell remains controlling for handgun-related matters.	State argues later codification mirrors federal law and is controlling.	Howell remains applicable to interpret handgun-related offenses; operability not required under §5-133(c).

Howell v. State, 278 Md. 389 (Md. 1976) (defined handgun to require firearm status and operability or readiness to be operable)
Nash v. State, 191 Md.App. 386 (Md. Ct. App. 2010) (firearm operability not required for §5-133 conviction)
Hicks v. State, 189 Md.App. 112 (Md. Ct. App. 2009) (persuasive on operability not required for §5-133)
York v. State, 56 Md.App. 222 (Md. Ct. App. 1983) (discussed operability in handgun contexts under prior regimes)
Pye v. State, 397 Md. 626 (Md. 2007) (operability evidence context in gun prosecutions)
United States v. Williams, 577 F.3d 878 (8th Cir. 2009) (federal §921(a)(3) not requiring operability)
United States v. Gwyn, 481 F.3d 849 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (§921(a)(3) includes inoperable firearms)