Moore v. Harper
600 U.S. 1
SCOTUS2023Background
- After the 2020 census North Carolina’s General Assembly enacted new 2021 congressional (and legislative) maps; plaintiffs sued in state court claiming the congressional map was an unconstitutional partisan gerrymander under the North Carolina Constitution.
- A three-judge trial court found the map a partisan outlier but declined relief as nonjusticiable; the North Carolina Supreme Court (Harper I) reversed, held partisan-gerrymandering claims justiciable under state law, rejected an Elections Clause defense, and enjoined use of the 2021 maps.
- The General Assembly adopted remedial maps; the trial court rejected them and adopted Special Masters’ interim maps; the North Carolina Supreme Court issued Harper II on remedy, then granted rehearing, withdrew Harper II and issued a later opinion (Harper III) overruling Harper I on justiciability and dismissing plaintiffs’ claims with prejudice (but did not simply reinstate the 2021 maps).
- The legislative defendants sought emergency relief and certiorari in the U.S. Supreme Court; after supplemental briefing this Court held it had jurisdiction to review Harper I and reached the merits.
- On the merits the Court held the Elections Clause does not preclude state courts from applying state constitutional constraints to state legislatures’ exercise of Elections-Clause authority; state courts remain subject to ordinary judicial review but federal courts retain a supervisory role to ensure state courts do not usurp the legislature’s assigned role; the Court affirmed the North Carolina Supreme Court’s judgment (as presented) but did not decide whether that court exceeded permissible bounds of review.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1. Jurisdiction / mootness — whether SCOTUS can decide after NC Supreme Court reheard and overruled Harper I | Harper (plaintiffs) argued the rehearing and final dismissal mooted the federal question | Moore (legislative defendants) argued Harper I’s judgment enjoining the 2021 maps remained binding and this Court can provide complete relief | Court: jurisdiction exists — Harper I finally decided the federal issue and its injunction still binds parties; Article III and 28 U.S.C. §1257(a) jurisdictional path is satisfied |
| 2. Scope of Elections Clause — whether it vests state legislatures with exclusive, independent authority immune from state-law constraints | Harper: state courts may review legislative redistricting under state constitutions and enforce state constitutional limits | Moore: "Legislature" in Clause means state legislatures act free from state-constitutional constraints on federal-election rules | Court: Elections Clause does not exempt state legislatures from ordinary state-constitutional restraints or from state-court review; legislatures act subject to their state constitutions |
| 3. Procedural vs substantive state constraints — are only procedural constraints (e.g., veto, referendum) permissible? | Harper: state constitutional provisions (including substantive constraints) can limit legislature’s exercise of Elections-Clause power | Moore: Smiley/Hildebrant permit only procedural restraints; substantive limits would conflict with federal delegation | Court: No clean procedure/substance divide in precedents; Smiley/Hildebrant/Arizona reject that limited reading and historical practice supports state constraints generally |
| 4. Federal review of state-court interpretations — what role do federal courts have reviewing state courts’ application of state law in Elections-Clause cases? | Harper: state courts are proper forums to enforce state constitutional limits; federal interference should be limited | Moore: federal courts should defer heavily or lack authority to second-guess state-court interpretations here | Court: Federal courts retain duty to ensure state-court interpretations do not arrogate the legislature’s federal Elections-Clause role; Court declines to adopt a specific test here and does not decide whether NC court exceeded bounds in this case |
Key Cases Cited
- Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137 (1803) (judicial review and courts’ duty to say what the law is)
- Ohio ex rel. Davis v. Hildebrant, 241 U.S. 565 (1916) (state referendum and Elections Clause: state-law procedures may apply to redistricting)
- Smiley v. Holm, 285 U.S. 355 (1932) (state legislative actions under Elections Clause must follow state lawmaking procedures, including governor participation where the state constitution provides)
- Arizona State Legislature v. Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission, 576 U.S. 787 (2015) (Elections Clause does not prohibit vesting redistricting power outside the representative legislature and recognizes state-constitutional constraints)
- McPherson v. Blacker, 146 U.S. 1 (1892) (Electors Clause interpretation; distinguishes ratifying/electoral functions from lawmaking)
- Leser v. Garnett, 258 U.S. 130 (1922) (state legislatures performing federal ratification functions act on behalf of federal power and are not constrained by state constitutions in that role)
- Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1975) (circumstances in which a state high-court decision on a federal issue is treated as a final judgment for Supreme Court review)
- Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000) (discusses limits on state-court interpretations of state law when federal questions are implicated; standards for federal review of state-court statutory interpretation in election cases)
- Genesis HealthCare Corp. v. Symczyk, 569 U.S. 66 (2013) (Article III mootness principle that controversy must exist at all stages)
- Chafin v. Chafin, 568 U.S. 165 (2013) (parties must retain a personal stake through all stages of review to satisfy Article III jurisdiction)
