Moody v. Michigan Gaming Control Board
847 F.3d 399
| 6th Cir. | 2017Background
- Daniel Moody, a harness-racing trainer, was investigated and temporarily disqualified by the Michigan Gaming Control Board (MGCB) after an anonymous tip probed whether he was a "paper trainer" for his father, John Moody (previously suspended and litigating against MGCB).
- MGCB held multiple administrative hearings (May, July, November 2012) investigating trainer responsibility, tax returns, stable lists, and alleged noncooperation; Moody produced testimony and some records and was directed to sign IRS authorization.
- Moody was disqualified from racing for six months beginning December 2012; a proposed consent order that would have shortened the disqualification required Moody to waive litigation against MGCB, which he did not sign; parties later settled administratively.
- In 2015 Moody sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 asserting: (I) First Amendment retaliation (based on his father’s protected speech), (II) deprivation of a liberty interest in working in the industry, and (III) deprivation of property interest in licenses without due process.
- The district court dismissed MGCB (Eleventh Amendment) and official-capacity defendants, and dismissed Moody’s claims on the merits: Moody lacked third-party standing for the retaliation claim because his father was not hindered from litigating; Counts II and III failed as to liberty and process.
- On appeal Moody challenged only the third-party standing ruling; the Sixth Circuit affirmed, holding Moody failed to show the requisite hindrance to his father’s ability to assert the claim.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Moody may assert a First Amendment retaliation claim on behalf of his father (third-party standing) | Moody: he suffered injury (disqualification), has close relationship with father, and father is hindered from suing (father lacked standing and was denied timely amendment) | Defendants: third-party standing requires hindrance; here father sued separately and faced no practical barrier to asserting his own rights | Court: Moody lacks third-party standing because father was not hindered—he had sued and faced no recognized barrier |
| Whether a third party’s lack of standing can itself be a "hindrance" for third-party standing analysis | Moody: father’s alleged lack of injury/standing means he lacks incentive to litigate, so Moody should be allowed to assert claim | Defendants: lack of standing is not a recognized hindrance; third-party must show practical barrier | Held: Court found no authority that lack of standing alone is a hindrance and rejected the argument |
| Whether denial of leave to amend by district court creates a hindrance for third-party standing | Moody: district court refused to let John amend to add the retaliation claim (untimely), so John was effectively prevented | Defendants: procedural denial of amendment is not the kind of systemic barrier contemplated for third-party standing | Held: Court held untimeliness/denial to amend is not a cognizable hindrance to third-party standing |
| Whether plaintiff raised a claim based on his own associational rights (avoiding third-party standing) | Moody: referenced familial relationship in briefing as supportive | Defendants: Moody never pled or argued he was targeted for his own associational rights; he relied on third-party standing | Held: Court noted Moody conceded he did not bring an associational claim; distinct cases where plaintiffs asserted their own association rights are inapplicable |
Key Cases Cited
- Winget v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., 537 F.3d 565 (6th Cir. 2008) (standard of review for Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal)
- Lynch v. Leis, 382 F.3d 642 (6th Cir. 2004) (standing must exist at time complaint is filed)
- Kowalski v. Tesmer, 543 U.S. 125 (2004) (third-party standing elements)
- Smith v. Jefferson Cty. Bd. of Sch. Comm’rs, 641 F.3d 197 (6th Cir. 2011) (application of third-party standing framework)
- Fieger v. Ferry, 471 F.3d 637 (6th Cir. 2006) (third-party standing discussion)
- Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400 (1991) (examples of practical hindrances supporting third-party standing)
- Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106 (1976) (privacy/chilling as a hindrance for third-party standing)
- Hodak v. City of St. Peters, 535 F.3d 899 (8th Cir. 2008) (no practical barrier if third party actually asserts his rights)
- Adkins v. Bd. of Educ. of Magoffin County, 982 F.2d 952 (6th Cir. 1993) (plaintiff asserting her own associational claim)
- Sowards v. Loudon County, 203 F.3d 426 (6th Cir. 2000) (employee’s own associational/ political-reprisal claim)