Montrell Deshone Anderson, Applicant-Appellant v. State of Iowa
16-1001
Iowa Ct. App.Jun 21, 2017Background
- Montrell Anderson was convicted in 2005 of first-degree burglary and second-degree sexual abuse after a jury trial; direct appeal affirmed and procedendo issued April 30, 2007.
- Anderson filed a first postconviction relief (PCR) application raising ineffective-assistance claims; it was denied and the denial was affirmed on appeal.
- Anderson filed a second PCR application on January 23, 2012, nearly five years after procedendo; the State moved to dismiss in January 2016 as time-barred under Iowa Code § 822.3.
- Anderson sought to amend his second application to allege newly discovered evidence concerning his right/title to occupy the premises, a recantation by the victim, and pressure on the victim by police/prosecutors; he did not invoke the statutory exception for evidence or law that could not have been raised earlier.
- The district court granted the State’s motion for summary dismissal, concluding the application was time-barred and its claims previously litigated; Anderson appealed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether second PCR is time-barred or fits § 822.3 exception | Anderson: alleges newly discovered evidence about occupancy/right to premises and other facts that couldn’t have been raised earlier | State: application filed after three-year limit and no showing it meets the exception for newly discovered fact or law | Court: Time-barred; Anderson failed to show exception applies |
| Whether alleged "new evidence" qualifies as newly discovered evidence | Anderson: new evidence proves his right/title to occupy premises and would affect conviction | State: Anderson didn’t show the evidence was discovered after verdict, not discoverable earlier with due diligence, material, or likely to change outcome | Court: Anderson failed to satisfy Harrington factors; evidence not shown to be newly discovered |
| Whether ineffective-assistance claims excuse the statute-of-limitations bar | Anderson: asserts ineffective assistance by trial and prior PCR counsel should be considered | State: ineffective assistance is not an exception to § 822.3 | Court: Rejects argument; ineffective assistance does not toll or create exception (Walker) |
| Whether summary dismissal was improper because factual development was needed | Anderson: sought opportunity to develop ineffective-assistance and new-evidence claims | State: procedural bar and prior litigation precludes relief; no genuine issue of material fact shown | Court: Summary dismissal proper under § 822.6; no genuine issue of material fact |
Key Cases Cited
- Castro v. State, 795 N.W.2d 789 (Iowa 2011) (standard of review for summary dismissal of PCR applications)
- Walker v. State, 572 N.W.2d 589 (Iowa 1997) (ineffective assistance of counsel does not create an exception to the PCR statute-of-limitations)
- Harrington v. State, 659 N.W.2d 509 (Iowa 2003) (four-factor test for newly discovered evidence in PCR context)
- Cornell v. State, 529 N.W.2d 606 (Iowa Ct. App. 1994) (burden on applicant to show PCR exception applies)
