795 N.W.2d 789
Iowa
2011

Mark Angelo CASTRO, Appellant, v. STATE of Iowa, Appellee.

No. 09-0332.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

April 1, 2011.

Mark C. Smith, State Appellate Defend￾er, and Thomas J. Gaul, Assistant State Appellate Defender, for appellant.

Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Kevin R. Cmelik, Assistant Attorney Gen￾eral, John P. Sarcone, County Attorney, and Frank Severino, Jr., Assistant County Attorney, for appellee.

CADY, Chief Justice.

In this appeal, we consider whether an application for postconviction relief from a judgment and sentence imposed in a crimi￾nal case based on a plea of guilty was properly dismissed on summary adjudica￾tion. On our review, we affirm the deci-

sion of the district court in part, reverse in evant to this appeal to support his applica￾part, and remand for further proceedings. tion. Castro first alleged the guilty plea was involuntary and unintelligent because

I. Background Facts and Proceed- his trial attorney failed to devote adequate ings. time to the investigation of his case prior Mark Castro was charged by the State to the plea. Castro next alleged the with five counts of sexual abuse in the guilty plea was involuntary and unintelli￾second degree in violation of Iowa Code gent because his trial attorney failed to in￾sections 709.1 and 709.3(2) (2005). He vestigate whether his mental health and subsequently pled guilty to five counts of medication regimen supported a diminish￾sexual abuse in the third degree in viola- ed-capacity defense to the crime or ren￾tion of Iowa Code section 709.4. The dered his incriminating statements invol￾crimes involved repeated sexual contact untary and inadmissible. Finally, Castro with a seven-year-old girl over a period of alleged his guilty plea was rendered invol￾approximately four months. Castro lived untary and unintelligent because his drug in an apartment with the child’s grand- regimen was altered just prior to the time mother, and the abuse occurred when the he entered his plea and his state of mind child visited her grandmother. Castro rendered him incompetent to fully under￾made numerous incriminating statements stand the proceedings. Castro attached to police during their investigation. The numerous documents to his application for statements were made after Castro was postconviction relief. These documents informed of his Miranda rights and signed primarily detailed the pharmacology, pur￾a written waiver of those rights. pose, warnings, precautions, and other in￾formation about the drugs he was taking. The district court accepted Castro’s plea Castro cited no particular information of guilty after considering his answers to a from the documents to support his claim. series of questions propounded by the court. Based on the colloquy, the court The State moved for summary judg￾found Castro entered his plea voluntarily, ment. First, it asserted the initial two understood his rights, and understood the grounds alleged by Castro could not sup￾consequences of his plea. In the course of port postconviction relief as a matter of the colloquy, Castro told the court he was law because the claims did not pertain to not under the influence of any medication matters intrinsic to the plea of guilty. As that impaired his ability to clearly think. such, the State claimed Castro was prohib￾He did inform the court he was taking ited from challenging alleged constitutional medication for high blood pressure, de- infirmities of the pre-plea actions or inac￾pression, and anxiety. Yet, he assured the tions of his trial counsel in a postconviction court the medication did not impair his relief proceeding because such challenges ability to understand his decision to plead were waived by pleading guilty and failing guilty or the proceedings. Castro identi- to file a subsequent motion in arrest of fied the medication as Atenolol, Lexapro, judgment. Second, the State claimed the and Ativan. Castro was sentenced to in- plea colloquy adequately showed Castro’s carceration for five consecutive ten-year medication regimen had no effect on the terms. voluntariness or understanding of his plea of guilty. Castro filed an application for postcon￾viction relief after he began serving his Castro resisted the motion for summary sentences. He alleged three grounds rel- judgment. While the resistance largely

sion of the district court in part, reverse in evant to this appeal to support his applica￾part, and remand for further proceedings. tion. Castro first alleged the guilty plea was involuntary and unintelligent because I. Background Facts and Proceed- his trial attorney failed to devote adequate ings. time to the investigation of his case prior Mark Castro was charged by the State to the plea. Castro next alleged the with five counts of sexual abuse in the guilty plea was involuntary and unintelli￾second degree in violation of Iowa Code gent because his trial attorney failed to in￾sections 709.1 and 709.3(2) (2005). He vestigate whether his mental health and subsequently pled guilty to five counts of medication regimen supported a diminish￾sexual abuse in the third degree in viola- ed-capacity defense to the crime or ren￾tion of Iowa Code section 709.4. The dered his incriminating statements invol￾crimes involved repeated sexual contact untary and inadmissible. Finally, Castro with a seven-year-old girl over a period of alleged his guilty plea was rendered invol￾approximately four months. Castro lived untary and unintelligent because his drug in an apartment with the child’s grand- regimen was altered just prior to the time mother, and the abuse occurred when the he entered his plea and his state of mind child visited her grandmother. Castro rendered him incompetent to fully under￾made numerous incriminating statements stand the proceedings. Castro attached to police during their investigation. The numerous documents to his application for statements were made after Castro was postconviction relief. These documents informed of his Miranda rights and signed primarily detailed the pharmacology, pur￾a written waiver of those rights. pose, warnings, precautions, and other in￾formation about the drugs he was taking. The district court accepted Castro’s plea Castro cited no particular information of guilty after considering his answers to a from the documents to support his claim. series of questions propounded by the court. Based on the colloquy, the court The State moved for summary judg￾found Castro entered his plea voluntarily, ment. First, it asserted the initial two understood his rights, and understood the grounds alleged by Castro could not sup￾consequences of his plea. In the course of port postconviction relief as a matter of the colloquy, Castro told the court he was law because the claims did not pertain to not under the influence of any medication matters intrinsic to the plea of guilty. As that impaired his ability to clearly think. such, the State claimed Castro was prohib￾He did inform the court he was taking ited from challenging alleged constitutional medication for high blood pressure, de- infirmities of the pre-plea actions or inac￾pression, and anxiety. Yet, he assured the tions of his trial counsel in a postconviction court the medication did not impair his relief proceeding because such challenges ability to understand his decision to plead were waived by pleading guilty and failing guilty or the proceedings. Castro identi- to file a subsequent motion in arrest of fied the medication as Atenolol, Lexapro, judgment. Second, the State claimed the and Ativan. Castro was sentenced to in- plea colloquy adequately showed Castro’s carceration for five consecutive ten-year medication regimen had no effect on the terms. voluntariness or understanding of his plea of guilty. Castro filed an application for postcon￾viction relief after he began serving his Castro resisted the motion for summary sentences. He alleged three grounds rel- judgment. While the resistance largely

sion of the district court in part, reverse in evant to this appeal to support his applica￾part, and remand for further proceedings. tion. Castro first alleged the guilty plea was involuntary and unintelligent because

of his drug regimen on his state of mind during the time of his plea presented an issue of material fact giving rise to the need for an evidentiary hearing.

focused on allegations pertaining to the of his drug regimen on his state of mind conduct amounting to ineffective assistance during the time of his plea presented an of counsel, Castro did allege his “guilty issue of material fact giving rise to the plea was not voluntary, knowing[], and need for an evidentiary hearing. intelligent[ ] due to ineffective assistance of counsel.” The resistance also asserted II. Standard of Review. factual issues existed concerning the effect We normally review postconvic￾of his medication regimen on his ability to tion proceedings for errors at law. Ever￾understand the plea proceedings, and a ett v. State, 789 N.W.2d 151, 155 (Iowa hearing was necessary so the factual dis- 2010). This includes summary dismissals pute over the effects of his medication of applications for postconviction relief. regimen could be resolved by medical tes- Manning v. State, 654 N.W.2d 555, 560 timony. (Iowa 2002). Applications for postconvic- ‘The district court granted summary tion relief that allege ineffective assistance judgment. It found first claims of counsel, however, raise a constitutional the established claim. State v. Nitcher, 720 N.W.2d 547, brought by Castro involving the acts or trial were intrinsic 553 (Iowa 2006). We review posteonvie- inactions of counsel not the guilty plea as a tion proceedings that raise constitutional to and were waived matter of law. Second, the court deter- infirmities de novo. Ledezma v. State, 626 mined prior plea colloquy N.W.2d 134, 141 (Iowa 2001). In deter- the established Castro’s medication regimen did not ren- mining whether summary judgment is der his guilty plea involuntary or unintelli- warranted, the moving party has the bur￾gent, and Castro to forward den of proving the material facts are un- disputed. Kolarik v. Cory Int’l Corp., 721 failed come with sufficient evidence to generate a gen- N.W.2d 159, 162(Iowa 2006). We examine uine factual dispute over the issue to over- the facts in the light most favorable to the come the prior finding by the trial court the nonmoving party. Id. that was and the plea voluntary intelligent. nonmoving party. Unlike the first two grounds, the court III. Discussion. recognized this third ground for relief was intrinsic to the plea. Yet, it concluded Generally, a criminal defendant Castro introduced no facts or opinions to waives all defenses and objections to the support a connection between the medi- criminal proceedings by pleading guilty, cation regimen or change in medication including claims of ineffective assistance of and an inability to voluntarily and intelli- counsel. Wise v. State, 708 N.W.2d 66, 70 gently enter a plea of guilty to warrant a (Iowa 2006). One exception to this rule hearing. involves irregularities intrinsic to the plea—irregularities that bear on the know- On appeal, Castro claims the district ing and voluntary nature of the plea. Id. court erred by categorically rejecting his first two claims of ineffective assistance of In State v. Carroll, 767 N.W.2d 638, 642 counsel. He claims the allegation support- (Iowa 2009), we clarified how the intrinsic￾ing the two grounds show they were in- irregularity exception applies to postcon￾trinsic to the plea of guilty, which entitled viction relief claims of ineffective assis￾him to a hearing on the merits. Further- tance of counsel predicated on the failure more, he claims the third ground for relief of counsel to perform certain pre-plea concerning his ability to enter a voluntary tasks that ultimately render the plea invol￾and intelligent guilty plea due to the effect untary or unknowing. This clarification

was a response to our opinion in Speed v. motion in arrest of judgment. Thus, the State, 616 N.W.2d 158 (Iowa 2000), in district court accepted Castro’s allegations which we said “claims arising from ... of ineffective assistance of counsel as true counsel’s failure to investigate or file a for purposes of summary judgment, but motion to suppress do not survive the en- found no cause of action existed as a mat￾try of a guilty plea.” Speed, 616 N.W.2d ter of law. at 159. In Carroll, we explained that inef￾fective-assistance-of-counsel claims survive The standards for summary the guilty plea when a postconviction relief judgment in postconviction relief actions applicant can show trial counsel breached are analogous to summary judgment in a duty in advance of the guilty plea that civil proceedings. Ridinger v. State, 341 rendered the plea involuntary or unintelli- N.W.2d 734, 736 (Iowa 1983). Under gent. Carroll, 767 N.W.2d at 644. Thus, these standards, summary judgment is the distinction between ineffeetive-assis- proper when the record reveals only a tance-of-counsel claims that do not survive conflict over the legal consequences of un￾a guilty plea as illustrated in Speed and disputed facts. Wallace v. Des Moines those that do survive is the existence of a Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Dirs., 754 showing that the pre-plea ineffective assis- N.W.2d 854, 857 (Iowa 2008). The moving tance of counsel rendered the plea involun- party is required to affirmatively establish tary or unintelligent. The component of that the undisputed facts support judg￾the claim involving the voluntariness of the ment under the controlling law. McVey v. plea is largely tied to the prejudice ele- Nat’l Org. Serv., Inc., 719 N.W.2d 801, 802 ment of all ineffective-assistance-of-eounsel (Iowa 2006). claims. Id. This element means criminal defendants who seek postconviction relief The summary judgment record re￾after pleading guilty must establish the veals Castro’s application for postconvic￾guilty plea would not have been entered tion relief and his resistance to the motion but for the breach of duty by counsel. Id. for summary judgment alleged the plea Thus, when a postconviction relief claim was involuntary and unintelligent “due to following a guilty plea is properly alleged, ineffective assistance of counsel” because a case-by-case analysis is necessary “to counsel failed to properly investigate Cas￾determine whether counsel in a particular tro’s mental state and file a motion to case breached a duty in advance of a guilty suppress evidence. These allegations plea, and whether any such breach ren- were sufficient to state a cause of action dered the defendant’s plea unintelligent or based on claims that were intrinsic to the involuntary.” Id. plea. They related to irregularities that A. Allegations Derived From Failure affected the voluntary nature of the plea. to Investigate and Failure to File a Mo- Importantly, the State did not further tion to Suppress. The district court challenge the sufficiency of Castro’s allega￾found the first two claims for postconvic- tions or the absence of evidence to support tion relief brought by Castro did not relate the allegations. Instead, the State only to the voluntariness of the plea, but only argued the claims did not survive Castro’s pertained to the constitutional deficiencies guilty plea. Likewise, the district court of the actions or inactions of his trial coun- found the claims were waived because they sel. As such, it concluded the claims were were based on pre-plea conduct of counsel. waived when Castro entered a plea of Yet, this conclusion failed to distinguish guilty and failed to subsequently file a pre-plea ineffective-assistance-of-counsel

claims properly tied to the voluntariness or relief on the first two claims were not intelligence of the plea. See Carroll, 767 intrinsic to the plea and had been waived. N.W.2d at 644 (“Only through a case-by￾When a motion for summary case analysis will a court be able to deter￾judgment seeks judgment on the basis that mine whether counsel in a particular case the plaintiffs claim does not provide relief breached a duty in advance of a guilty as a matter of law, the plaintiff is only plea, and whether any such breach ren￾required to resist the motion by respond- dered the defendant’s plea unintelligent or ing to those elements of the claim for relief involuntary.”). under attack. See Iowa Ct. R. 1.981(3), On appeal, the State changes its (5). Any other approach could deprive the challenge by arguing Castro failed to suffi- nonmovant of the opportunity provided un￾ciently tie his ineffective-assistance-of-- der the rules of summary judgment to counsel claims to the voluntariness of his address the actual grounds for summary plea. Specifically,the State argues on ap- judgment. Id. Similarly, a party who has peal Castro failed to include an allegation successfully moved for summary judgment that he would not have pled guilty if he may not raise different grounds on appeal would have received effective assistance of to support summary judgment than those counsel but instead would have proceeded raised before the district court. See De￾to trial. The State asserts Castro was Voss v. State, 648 N.W.2d 56, 62-63 (Iowa required to make this allegation to over- 2002) (recognizing only grounds urged in come a motion for summary judgment. the district court are considered on ap￾As we recognized in Carroll, all postcon- peal). These principles are applicable to viction relief applicants who seek relief as this case and direct the outcome. a consequence of ineffective assistance of The State attacked Castro’s claim for counsel must establish counsel breached a postconviction relief as one that broadly duty and prejudice resulted. Id. The fell within the categories of pre-plea inef￾burden to prove the prejudice element ulti- fective-assistance-of-counsel claims ad￾mately requires a postconviction relief ap- dressed in Speed that are waived by plicant who has entered a plea of guilty to pleading guilty. As such, Castro was only establish a reasonable probability of a dif- required to resist the motion by showing ferent outcome (stand for trial instead of his claim was connected to the voluntari￾pleading guilty) if the breach had not oc￾ness of his plea. Because Castro properly curred. Id. Yet, the State in this ease made this showing, the district court im￾had the burden in moving for summary properly granted summary judgment. judgment to show it was entitled to sum￾mary judgment as a matter of law. The B. Allegation That Medication State did not attack Castro’s claim for Rendered the Plea of Guilty Involuntary postconviction relief by arguing the undis- and Unintelligent. Castro’s third claim puted facts showed he would have pled on postconviction relief alleged the medi￾guilty even in the absence of a breach of cation he was taking prior to the hearing duty or by arguing there was no evidence rendered his guilty plea involuntary and to support a claim that Castro would not unintelligent. The district court premised have pled guilty in the absence of ineffec- its. summary judgment ruling on the con￾tive assistance of counsel. Instead, the trary finding in the plea colloquy establish￾State only sought summary judgment on ing Castro was not affected by the specific the basis that the underlying grounds for medications he was taking at the time.

The colloquy included a specific inquiry additional facts in the summary judgment regarding Castro’s medications and wheth- proceedings not disclosed in the prior plea er Castro believed he understood the pro- colloquy—that his medication regimen was ceedings and the guilty plea. The State altered just prior to the time he entered asserts this finding supported summary his plea of guilty. Second, he claims sum￾judgment, and Castro failed to come for- mary judgment was improper because the ward with evidence to show a factual dis- background information he submitted con￾pute existed over the voluntariness of the cerning the medication he was taking, to￾plea. gether with the evidence of the change in his medication regimen just prior to his Our rules of summary judgment do not plea, entitled him to a hearing to permit permit the nonmovant to rest on concluso￾him to produce a medical expert to resolve ry allegations in the pleadings in the face motion the issue of the voluntariness of his plea. of a properly supported for sum￾mary judgment. Iowa Ct. R. 1.981(5) The inference Castro seeks to es- (“When a motion for summary judgment is tablish in resistance to the State’s motion made and supported as provided in this for summary judgment is that the altera￾rule, an adverse party may not rest upon tion of his medication caused his plea to be the mere allegations or denials in the involuntary or unintelligent. Yet, such an pleadings.... ”). A responsive showing inference would normally be speculative must be made that would allow a reason- without the support of a medical expert. able fact finder to conclude in favor of the See Ranes v. Adams Labs., Inc., 778 nonmovant on the claim. See Parish v. Jumpking, Inc., 719 N.W.2d 540, 545 cal testimony “unquestionably required” to (Iowa 2006) (stating the requirement for a assist in determining complicated issues of response to a motion for summary judg- causation). An inference to create a tri￾ment must assert genuine issues of facts, able issue in response to a motion for Which are sufficient if “a reasonable fact summary judgment cannot be based on finder could return a verdict or decision conjecture or speculation. See Blackston for the nonmoving party based upon those v. Shook & Fletcher Insulation Co., 764 facts”). In making this showing, the non- F.2d 1480, 1482 (11th Cir.1985) (“In con￾movant is entitled to all reasonable infer- sidering a motion for summary judgment, ences from the summary judgment record. ... [a]ll reasonable inferences arising from Schneider v. State, 789 N.W.2d 138, 144 the undisputed facts should be made in (Iowa 2010). favor of the nonmovant, but an inference A plea colloquy that covers the specific based on speculation and conjecture is not ground subsequently raised in a postcon- reasonable.” (Citations omitted.)). In this viction relief application would normally case, evidence that Castro’s medication re￾support summary judgment on those gimen was altered and general background grounds. See Wise, 708 N.W.2d at 71 information about the medication he was (indicating that statements made to court taking would not, alone, allow a reasonable in plea colloquy establish a presumption of fact finder to conclude the guilty plea he the true facts on the record). Notwith- entered was not voluntary or intelligent. standing, Castro claimed summary judg- While there might be some circumstances ment was improper in this case for two when a causation inference could be drawn reasons. First, he claims summary judg- between the consumption of drugs and the ment was improper because he alleged voluntariness of a plea without expert tes-

timony, a layperson does not possess the so. The district court properly granted knowledge to reasonably draw such an in- summary judgment on the third ground ference under the circumstances of this for relief. case. Here, the drugs involved a regimen IV. Conclusion. of multiple prescription medications that We affirm the district court in part and were allegedly altered or not taken prior reverse the decision of the district court in to the plea proceedings. A layperson part. The case is remanded to the district could not reasonably conclude such a court for further proceedings. change in the regimen of the drugs ren￾ dered the plea involuntary or unintelligent. DISTRICT COURT JUDGMENT AF￾ Thus, Castro’s allegations were insufficient FIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN to withstand summary adjudication under PART, AND CASE REMANDED.

Moreover, when the State produces evi￾dence of the district court’s finding during All justices concur except the colloquy that the medication did not WATERMAN, MANSFIELD, and affect the voluntariness of Castro’s plea, ZAGER, JJ., who take no part.

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