Montgomery County v. Bhatt
130 A.3d 424
Md.2016Background
- The former Georgetown Branch of the B&O Railroad (established by an 1890 deed conveying a 45-foot strip each side of center line) ceased freight service in 1985 and the Montgomery County acquired the corridor in 1988 under Rails-to-Trails procedures and a Certificate of Interim Trail Use; the corridor is now the Capital Crescent Trail and planned for the Purple Line.
- Respondent Ajay Bhatt owns Lot 8 abutting the corridor; a fence and shed erected by his predecessors encroached beyond the recorded rear lot line onto the former rail right-of-way for decades (testimony placed the fence present since the 1960s).
- Montgomery County issued a civil citation under County Code § 49-10(b) prohibiting structures in a public right-of-way; the District Court found Bhatt guilty and ordered removal; Bhatt appealed to the Circuit Court.
- The Circuit Court concluded the County held fee simple (per expert) but nevertheless held the interest was not a “right-of-way” susceptible to the ordinance and that Bhatt had acquired title by adverse possession; the Circuit Court vacated the District Court judgment.
- The County petitioned for certiorari to the Maryland Court of Appeals; the Court considered whether (inter alia) a railroad right-of-way is susceptible to adverse possession when not clearly abandoned, and whether Bhatt acquired title.
- The Court of Appeals reversed the Circuit Court: it held railroad rights-of-way are analogous to public highways (protected from adverse possession absent clear abandonment), the corridor’s interim trail use and rail-banking show no abandonment, and Bhatt’s encroachments violated § 49-10(b).
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Montgomery County) | Defendant's Argument (Bhatt) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether a railroad conveyance like the 1890 deed created a right-of-way immune from adverse possession | The railroad corridor is equivalent to a public highway and public rights-of-way (fee or easement) cannot be lost by adverse possession except after clear abandonment | The corridor was privately used as a railroad and thus susceptible to adverse possession by long encroachment | Held for County: railroad rights-of-way are treated like public highways and are generally immune from adverse possession absent clear abandonment |
| Whether County proved Bhatt’s fence and shed encroached on the corridor | County presented surveys, aerials, historical deed showing fence/shed lie beyond Lot 8 onto the right-of-way | Bhatt disputed County title and relied on ancestral continuous possession and use | Held for County: evidence established encroachment onto County’s right-of-way |
| Whether interim conversion to a hiker/biker trail (and rail-bank status) constitutes abandonment of public use | County: interim trail use under Rails-to-Trails and rail-banking are consistent with retained public/rail use and not abandonment | Bhatt: non-use or private nature of past rail operations allowed adverse possession to mature | Held for County: interim trail use and rail-bank procedures show no unequivocal intent to abandon public use |
| Whether Bhatt acquired title by adverse possession after 20 years of encroachment | Bhatt: possession was actual, open, notorious, exclusive, hostile, and continuous for statutory period | County: public/right-of-way status precludes running of the statute against public use without clear abandonment | Held for County: adverse possession cannot run against public right-of-way here; Bhatt did not acquire title |
Key Cases Cited
- Olcott v. Fond du Lac Cty., 83 U.S. 678 (1872) (railroads function as public highways and public use supports eminent domain authority)
- Ulman v. Charles St. Avenue Co., 83 Md. 130 (1896) (abutting owner cannot acquire title to public road by encroachment)
- Chevy Chase Land Co. v. United States, 355 Md. 110 (1999) (conversion from rail to hiker/biker trail can be consistent with prior railway public use and within scope of grant)
- Read v. Montgomery Cnty., 101 Md. App. 62 (1994) (discusses distinction between fee and easement conveyances and abandonment inquiry for rights-of-way)
- East Washington Ry. Co. v. Brooke, 244 Md. 287 (1966) (right-of-way granted for railroad purposes only reverted when railroad abandoned railroad use)
- Preseault v. I.C.C., 494 U.S. 1 (1990) (Rails-to-Trails Act prevents interim trail use from being treated as abandonment under state law)