Olcott v. Supervisors, 1872 U.S. LEXIS 1193

Mf. Justice STRONG

delivered the opinion of the court.

Whether the act of Assembly of the State.of Wisconsin, approved April 10th,1867, underwhich the county orders or promissory notes sued upon, in this case, were issued, was a lawful exercise of constitutional power, is the only question in the case. In the court below, the jury was instructed, in substance, that the issue of thé orders was unauthorized and void, and that the act of Assembly, above referred to, was an unconstitutional exercise of legislative power. No other question was made at the trial, and.no other is now presented to us for our determination.

: At the outset we are met by the fact that the Supreme Court of the State has decided the act was unauthorized by the' constitution. • It was thus ruled in Whiting v. Fond du Lac County. * If that decision is binding upon the Federal courts, if it has established a rule which we are under obligations to follow, the matter is settled.

' It is undoubtedly true in general, that this court does follow the decisions of the highest courts of the States respecting local questions peculiar to themselves, or respecting the construction of their own constitutions and laws. But it must be kept in mind that it is only decisions upon local questions, those which are peculiar to the several States, or adjudications upon the meaning of the constitution or statutes of a State, which the Federal courts adopt as rules for their own judgments. That Whiting v. Fond du Lac County was not a determination of any question of local law, is manifest. It is not claimed -to have been that. But it is relied upon as having given a construction to the constitution of the State. Very, plainly, however, such was not its character or effect. The question considered by the court was not one of interpretation or construction. The meaning of no provision of the State constitution was considered or declared. What was considered was the uses for which taxation generally, taxation by any government, might be authorized, and particularly whether the construction and maintenance of a railroad, owned by .'a corporation, is a matter of public concern. It was asserted (what nobody doubts), that the taxing power of a State extends no farther than to raise money for a public use, as distinguished from private, or to accomplish some end public in its nature, and it was decided that building a railroad, if it be constructed and owned by a corporation, though built by authority of the State, is not a matter, in which the public has any interest, of such a nature as to warrant taxation in its aid. For this reason it was held that the State had no power to authorize the imposition of taxes to aid in the construction of such a railroad,, and therefore that.the statute giving Fond du Lac County power to extend such aid was invalid.This was a determination of no local question, or question of statutory or constitutional construction. It was not decided that the legislature had not general legislative power; or that'it might not impose or authorize tfie imposition of taxes for any public use. Now, whether a use is public or private is not a question of constitutional construction. It is a question of general law. It has as -much reference.to the constitution of any other State as it has to.the State of Wisconsin. Its solution must be sought notin the decisions of any single State tribunal, but in general-principles' common to all courts. The nature of taxation, what uses are public and what are private, and the extent of unrestricted legislative power, are matters which, like questions of commercial law, no State court can conclusively determine for us. This consideration alone satisfies our minds' that Whiting v. Fond du Lac County furnishes no rule which should control our judgment, though the case is undoubtedly entitled to great respect.

There is another consideration that leads directly to the same conclusion. This court has always ruled that if a contract when made was valid under the constitution and laws of a State, as they had been previously expounded by its judicial tribunals, and as they were understood at the time, no subsequent action by the legislature or the judiciary will be regarded by this court as establishing its invalidity. * Such a rule is based upon the highest principles, of. justice. Parties have a right to contract, and they'do contract in vieW of the law as declared to them when their engagements are formed. Nothing can,justify us in holding them to any other rule. If, then, the doctrine asserted in Whiting v. Fond du Lac County is inconsistent with what was the recognized law of the State when the county orders were issued,,we are under no obligation to accept it and apply it to this case. The orders were issued in February, 1869, and it Was not until 1870 that the Supreme Court of the State decided that the uses for which taxation was authorized by the statute of April 10th, 1867, were' not public uses, and therefore that the statute was invalid. Prior to 1870 it seems to have been as well settled in Wisconsin'as elsewhere that the construction of a railway was a matter of public concern, and not the less so because done by a private corporation. That the State might itself make such an improvement, and impose taxes to defray the cost, or exercise its right of eminent domain therefor, was beyond question. Yet confessedly it could neither take.property or tax for such .a purpose, unless the, use for which the property was taken or the tax collected was a public one. And it was also the undoubted law of the State that building a railroad or a caual by an incorporated company was an act done for a public use, and thus the power of the legislature to delegate to such a company the State right of eminent domain was justified. In Pratt v. Brown, * it was said by the Supreme .Court of the State that the incorporation of companies for the purpose of constructing railroads or canals affords the best illustration of the delegation of power to exercise the right of eminent domain, by the condemnation and seizure of private property for public use upon making just compensation therefor. It is admitted that the only principle upon which such delegation of power can be justified is that the property taken by these companies is taken for the public use. Similar language was used and a decision to the same effect was made in Robbins v. The Railroad Company. † In Hasbrouck v. Milwaukee, ‡ a case where the fight to tax for the improvement of a harbor Was under consideration, the court used this significant language:

“ The power of municipal corporations, when authorized by the legislature to engage in works of internal improve ment, such as the building oe rairroads, canals, harbors, and the like, or to loan their credit in aid thereof, and to defray the expenses of such improvements, make good their predg'es by an exercise of the power of taxing the. persons and property of their citizens, has always been sustained on the ground that such works, although they are in general operated and controlled by private corporations, are nevertheless, by reason of the facilities which they afford for trade, commerce, and intercommunication between different and distant portions of the country, indispensable to the public interests and public functions. It was originally supposed that they would add, and subsequent experience demonstrated that they have addéd vastly, an.d almost immeasurably, to the general business, the commercial prosperity, and the' pecuniary resources of the inhabitants of cities, towns, villages, and rural districts through which they pass, and with which they are connected, It is, in view of these results, the public good thus produced, and the benefits thus conferred upon the persons and property of all the individuals composing the community, that courts have been able to pronounce them matters of public concern, for the accomplishment of which the taxing power might- lawfully be called into action. It is in this sense that they are said to fall so far within the purposes for which municipal corporations are created,-that such corporations may engage in, or pledge their credit for their construction.”

So also in Soens v. Racire, * †where the validity of a law authorizing a local tax to secure the lake shore was in question, the court discussed at length the nature of a public use for which taxation was lawful, and ruled that the use was a public one though only the property of some inhabitants of the city was saved, remarking that to determine whether a matter is a public or merely private concern we have not to determine whether or not the interests of some individuals will be directly promoted, but whether those of the whole or the greater part of the community will be. And again, in Brodhead v. Milwaukee, † the court said:

“The legislature cannot create a public debt, or levy a tax, or authorize a municipal corporation to dó so, in order to raise .funds for a mere private purpose. It cannot, in the form of a tax, take the money of the citizen and give it to an individual, the public interest or loelfare being in no way connected with the transaction. The objects for which the money is raised by taxation must be public, and such as subserve the common interest and wellbeing of the community required to contribute. ... To justify the court in arresting the proceedings and declaring the tax void, the abseuce of all possible public interest in the purposes for which the funds are raised must be clear and palpable; so clear and palpable as to be perceptible by every mind at the first blush.”

All these expositions of the law of the State were made by its highest court before the county orders now in suit were issued. They certainly did assert that building a railroad, whether built by the State or by a corporation created by the State for the purpose, was a matter of public concern, and that because it was a public use, the right of eminent domain might be exerted or delegated for it, and taxation might be authorized for its aid. It was the declared law of the State, therefore, when the bonds now in suit were issued, that the uses of railroads, though built by private corporations, were public uses,- such as wari’auted the exercise of the public right of eminent domain in their aid, and also the power of taxation.

"We are not, then, concluded by a decision, made in 1870, that such public uses are not of a nature to justify the imposition of taxes. We are at liberty to inquire what are public uses, and what restrictions, if any, are imposed upon the State’s taxing power.

It is not claimed that the constitution of Wisconsin contains any express denial of power in the legislature to authorize municipal corporations to aid in the construction of railroads, or to impose taxes for that purpose. The entire legislative power of the State is confessedly vested in the General Assembly. An implied inhibition only is asserted. It is insisted that, as the State cannot itself impose taxes for any other than a public use, so the legislature can'uot empower a municipal division of the State to levy'and collect taxes for any'other than such a use, and it is denied that taxation to enable the county of Fond du Lac to aid in the completion of the Sheboygau and Fond du Lac Railroad is taxation for a-public use. No one contends that the power of a State to tax, or to authorize taxation, is not limited by the uses to which the proceeds may be devoted. Undoubtedly taxes may not be laid for a private use. But is the construction of a railroad by a company incorporated by a State for the purppse of building it, and endowed .with the State’s right of eminent domain, a thing in which, the State has, as such, no interest? That the legislature of Wisconsin may alter or repeal the charter granted to the Sheboygan and Fond du Lac Railroad Company is certain. This is a power reserved by the constitution. The railroad can, therefore, be controlled and regulated by the State. Its use can be defined; its tolls and rates for transportation maybe limited. - Is a work made by authority of the State, .subject thus to its regulation,' and having for its object an increase of public convenience, to be regarded as ordinary private property ?

That railroads, though constructed by private corporations and owned by them, are public highways,- has been the doctrine of nearly all the courts ever since .such conveniences for passage and transportation have had any existence. Very early the question arose whether a State’s right of eminent domain could be exercised by a private corporation created for the purpose of constructing a railroad. Clearly it could not, unless taking land for sueh a purpose by such an agency is taking land for public use. The right of eminent- domain nowhere justifies taking property for a private use. Yet it is a doctrine universally accepted that a State legislature niay authorize a private corporation to take laud for the construction of such a road, making compensation to the owner. What else does this docti’ine mean if not that building a l’ailroad, though it be built by a private corporation, is an act done for a public use? And the reason why the use has always been held a public one is that such a road is a highway, whether made by the' government itself or by the agency of corporate bodies, or even by individuals when they obtain their power to construct it from legislative grant. It would be- useless to cite the numerous decisions to this effect which have been made in the State courts. We may, however, refer to two or three which exhibit fully not only the doctrine itself, but the reasoiis upon which it rests. *

Whether thé use of a railroad is a public or a private.one depends in no measure upon the question who constructed it or who owns it. It has never been considered a matter of any importance, that the road was built by the agency of a private corporation. No matter who is the agent, the function performed is that of the State. Though the own-' ership is private the use is public. So turnpikes, bridges, ferries, and canal„s, although made by individuals under public grants, or by companies, are regarded as publici juris. .The right to exact tolls or charge freights is granted for a service to the public. The' owners may be private companies, but they are compellable to permit the public to. use their works in the manner in which such works can be used- † That all persons may not put their own cars upon the road, and use their own motive power, has no bearing upon the question whether the road is a public highway. It bears only upon the mode of use, of which the legislature is the exclusive judge. ‡

It is unnecessary, however, to pursue this branch of the inquiry further, for it is not sei'iously denied that a railroad, though constructed and owned by a private corporation, is a matter of public concern, and that its uses are so far public that the right of eminent domain of the State may be ex erted to facilitate its construction. But it is contended that though the purpose aud the use may be public, sufficiently to justify taking private property, they are not public when the right to impose taxes is asserted. It is argued that there are differences between the power of taxation aud the power of taking private property for a public use, and that because of these differences it does not follow that wherever the one power may be exerted the other can. We do not care to inquire whether this is so or not. The question now is whether if a railroad, built and owned by a private corporation, is for a public use, because it is a highway, taxes may not be imposed in furtherance of that use. If there be any purpose for which taxation would seem to be legitimate it is the making and maintenance of highways. They have always been governmental affair’s, and it has ever been recognized as one of the most important duties of the State to provide and care for them. Taxation for such uses has been immemorially imposed. "When, therefore, it is settled that a railroad is a highway for public uses, there can be no substantial reason why the power of the State to tax may not be exerted -in its behalf. It is said that railroads are not public highways per se; that they are only declared such by the decisions of the courts, aud that they have been declared public only, with respect to the power of eminent domain. This is a mistake. In their very nature they are public highways. It needed no decision of courts to make them such. True they must be used in a peculiar manner, and under certain restrictions, but they are facilities for passage and transportation afforded to the public, of which the pub-lie has a right to avail itself. As well might it be said a turnpike is a highway, only because declared such by judicial decision. A railroad built by a State no' one claims would be anything else than a public highway, justifying taxation for its construction and maintenance, though it could be no more open to public-use than is a road built and owned by a corporation. Yet it is the purpose and the uses of a work which determine its character. And if the purpose is one for which the State may properly levy a tax upon its citizens at large, its legislature has the power to apportion and impose the duty, or confer the power of assuming it upon the municipal divisions of the State. * And surely it cannot be maintained that ownership by the public, or bj'the State, of the thing in behalf of which taxation is imposed, is necessary to justify the imposition. -There are many acknowledged public uses that have no relation to ownership. Indeed, most public expenditures are for purposes apart from any proprietorship of the State. A public use may, indeed, consist in the possession, occupation, and enjoyment of property by the public, or agents of the public, but it is not necessarily so. Even in regard to common roads, generally, the public has no ownership of the soil, no right of possession, or occupation. It has a mere right of passage. While, then, it may be true that .ownership of property may sometimes bear upon the question-whether the uses of the property are public, it is not the test.

The argument most earnestly urged against the constitutionality of the act is that it attempted to authorize Fond du Lac County to assist the railroad company by a donation. It is stoutly contended that the legislature could not authorize the county to impose taxes to enable it to make a donation in aid of the construction of the railroad, even if its ultimate uses are public. But why not? If the county can be empowered to aid the work because it is a public use, what difference can it make in what mode the aid be extended ? It is conceded that in Wisconsin municipal corporations may be authorized to become subscribers to the stock of private railroad companies, and to raise money by taxation to meet bonds given in payment of the subscriptions. This has been decided by the highest court of the State. † And che reasons given for the decision are, not that the municipal bodies acquired property rights by their subscriptions, or that they thereby obtained partial control of the :ailroad companies, but that subscriptions to the stock were a mode of aiding a work in which the public had an interest, a work of such a nature that it might properly be aided by taxation. Never was the right to tax supposed to rest in any degree upon anything else. Whether the stock had-value or not was not even considered. Equally with the taxation, the municipal subscription could be justified only because it was for a public use. If taxation is'invalid because laid for a private use, the nature of the use-cannot be changed by receiving’stock for the money raised. ' There is no substantial difference in principle between aid given to a railroad company by subscription to its stock and aid given by donations of money or land. The. burden upon the county may be tire same in whichever mode the aid is given, aud the uses promoted are precisely the same. And the courts have never attempted to make any distinction -in the cases; certainly not until- the case of Whiting v. Fond du Lac County, and even then no real difference is shown. On the other hand, the power to tax for the purpose of making donations in aid of railroads built by private corporations has been affirmed: * †We have, however, considered this subject in the case of the Railroad Co. v. County of Otoe, † and nothing more need now be said. What we have already remarked is sufficient to show that in our opinion the act of the legislature of Wisconsin, approved April 10th, 1867, was a constitutional exercise of legislative power, and .consequently that the Circuit Court erred in instructing the jury that it was unconstitutional and void, aud in directing a verdict for the defendants.

Judgment reversed, and the record remitted, with instructions to award

A VENIRE DE NOVO.

The CHIEF JUSTICE, Mr. Justice MILLER, and Mr. Justice DAVIS dissented from the preceding opinion.

Notes

*

25 Wisconsin, 188.

*

Havemeyer v. Iowa City, 3 Wallace, 294; Gelpcke v. The City of Dubuque, 1 Id. 175; Ohio Life and Trust Company v. Debolt, 16 Howard, 432.

*

3 Wisconsin, 612.

†

6 Id. 641.

‡

13 Id. 37.

*

10 Wisconsin, 280.

†

19 Id. 652; see also Clark v. Janesville, 10 Id. 136; and Bushnell v. Beloit, Ib. 195.

*

Beekman v. The Saratoga and Schenectady Railroad Co., 3 Paige, 45; Bloodgood v. The Mohawk and Hudson Railroad Co., 18 Wendell, 1; Worcester v. Railroad Co., 4 Metcalf, 564.

†

Charles River Bridge Co. v. Warren, 7 Pickering, 495.

‡

Cooley’s Constitutional Limitations.

*

Cooley’s Constitutional Limitations, 262.

†

Clark v. Janesville, 10 Wisconsin, 136; Bushnell v. Beloit, Ib. 195.

*

Gibbons v. Mobile and Great Northern Railroad Co., 36 Alabama, 410; Davidson et al. v. Commissioners of Ramsay County, Minnesota.

†

Supra, p. 675.

Case Details

Case Name: Olcott v. Supervisors

Court Name: Supreme Court of the United States

Date Published: Mar 31, 1873

Citations: 1872 U.S. LEXIS 1193; 83 U.S. 678; 16 Wall. 678; 21 L. Ed. 382

Court Abbreviation: U.S.