Montana Immigrant Justice Alliance v. Bullock, 371 P.3d 430

Background

In 2012 Montana voters adopted Legislative Referendum 121 (codified § 1-1-411, MCA), barring certain state services to "illegal aliens" and defining that term as anyone not a U.S. citizen who has unlawfully entered or remains unlawfully in the U.S.
Montana Immigrant Justice Alliance (MIJA), joined by others, sued for declaratory and injunctive relief before enforcement, alleging federal preemption and other constitutional defects; the District Court issued a limited preliminary injunction narrowing the definition and limited SAVE reliance.
The State argued lack of standing because it had "disavowed" enforcing the unlawful-entry aspect; the District Court found MIJA had associational standing based on members’ credible fear of being classified as "illegal aliens."
On cross-motions for summary judgment the District Court held LR 121 preempted except for the mandatory-reporting provision (§ 1-1-411(3)); the court later denied, then—after this Court’s Svee decision—awarded MIJA attorney fees.
The Montana Supreme Court affirmed that LR 121 is preempted in its entirety (including the reporting requirement) because the statute (1) creates an immigration classification not found in federal law and (2) authorizes state-level immigration-status determinations inconsistent with federal schemes; it reversed the award of attorney fees.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Standing / Ripeness	MIJA: associational standing based on members’ credible fear of being denied benefits under LR 121	State: disavowal of enforcement removes any credible threat, so claims are unripe	MIJA has associational standing; State's disavowal insufficient to defeat pre-enforcement challenge
Field preemption (does LR 121 regulate immigration?)	MIJA: LR 121 creates a novel immigration classification and empowers state officials to adjudicate status	State: LR 121 does not purport to regulate admission/removal and mirrors federal practices (SAVE)	LR 121 is field preempted because it attempts to classify aliens and delegate discretionary status decisions to state actors
Conflict preemption (does LR 121 conflict with federal benefits classifications?)	MIJA: LR 121’s "illegal alien" definition disqualifies persons whom federal law treats as eligible (e.g., lawful permanent residents)	State: federal law allows states to deny benefits and sometimes uses similar terms	LR 121 is conflict preempted because its definition and eligibility rules obstruct federal classifications and objectives
Attorney fees	MIJA: entitled to fees under Declaratory Judgment Act and state law as prevailing party	State: defense was reasonable; no bad faith or frivolous conduct; Svee does not broadly alter fee standards	Fee award reversed: State’s defense was not frivolous and Svee did not change the governing equitable threshold for declaratory-relief fee awards

Key Cases Cited

Gryczan v. State, 283 Mont. 433 (1997) (pre-enforcement facial challenge may be justiciable where statute targets plaintiffs and enforcement is not disavowed)
Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387 (2012) (federal government has broad, exclusive power over immigration; field and conflict preemption doctrines explained)
De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351 (1976) (not every state enactment concerning aliens is preempted, but States cannot classify aliens)
Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982) (States have no power to classify aliens in ways that conflict with federal objectives)
City of Helena v. Svee, 377 Mont. 158 (2014) (equitable circumstances can justify attorney fees in exceptional declaratory judgment cases)
Lozano v. City of Hazleton, 724 F.3d 297 (3d Cir. 2013) (local ordinances that regulate alien residency are field preempted)
Villas at Parkside Partners v. City of Farmers Branch, 726 F.3d 524 (5th Cir. 2013) (local determinations of "lawful presence" preempted where they intrude on federal classification)
United States v. Alabama, 691 F.3d 1269 (11th Cir. 2012) (state law that effectively governs presence of aliens is preempted)
Chaudhry v. Holder, 705 F.3d 289 (7th Cir. 2013) (INA lacks a statutory definition for "lawful immigration status," illustrating federal control over classifications)
League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Wilson, 908 F. Supp. 755 (C.D. Cal. 1995) (distinguishing ministerial verification via federal databases from state-made discretionary immigration determinations)