604 U.S. 712
SCOTUS2025Background
- Hugo Monsalvo Velázquez conceded removability but was granted voluntary departure for "60 days" by the BIA; the BIA warned that failure to depart would trigger removal and statutory penalties (including 10‑year ineligibility for relief).
- The BIA’s 60‑day period began October 12, 2021 and, measured as calendar days, expired on Saturday, December 11, 2021.
- Monsalvo served a motion to reopen (overnight delivery) on December 10; the BIA accepted/treated it as filed on Monday, December 13, 2021.
- The BIA denied the motion on the merits and—on its own—held the motion was untimely because the voluntary‑departure period expired on December 11 (reading “days” as calendar days).
- The Tenth Circuit affirmed; it read §1229c(b)(2) to mean calendar days. The Court granted certiorari to resolve a circuit split about whether a statutory deadline that falls on a weekend/holiday extends to the next business day and to address a government jurisdictional objection.
- The Supreme Court (majority) held it had jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. §1252 to review the legal interpretation of a term in a final order of removal and ruled that §1229c(b)(2)’s “60 days” extends to the next business day when the final day falls on a weekend or legal holiday, reversing the Tenth Circuit.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Monsalvo) | Defendant's Argument (Bondi/Gov) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1) Whether a court of appeals has statutory jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. §1252 to review a legal interpretation of a term in a final order of removal when the petitioner does not challenge removability | Monsalvo: §1252 permits review of "final order[s] of removal" and "questions of law arising from" them; he sought review of the meaning of the 60‑day term in his final order | Gov: §1252 jurisdiction is removal‑focused; to obtain review a petitioner must challenge removability itself (or otherwise fit within Nasrallah categories) | Court: §1252 authorizes review of legal questions arising from a final order of removal; petitioner need not press a meritless removability claim to secure review (jurisdiction found) |
| 2) Whether "60 days" in 8 U.S.C. §1229c(b)(2) counts calendar days (no rollover) or extends to the next business day if the last day falls on a weekend/holiday | Monsalvo: "days" should be read in light of longstanding immigration practice and other §304 deadlines to roll over when the final day is a weekend/holiday; thus his deadline extended to Mon. Dec. 13, 2021 | Gov: Ordinary meaning is calendar days; regulatory definitions apply only to agency rules, not to statutes; Congress used 60 days (not a regulatory precursor), so no rollover | Court: "Days" in §1229c(b)(2) adopts the specialized administrative meaning—consistent with longstanding regulatory practice and contemporaneous statutory provisions—so the deadline extends to the next business day (vacating Tenth Circuit) |
| 3) Whether regulatory background, the presumption of consistent usage, or a procedural/substantive distinction justifies or defeats the rollover rule | Monsalvo: Congress enacted §304 against a regulatory backdrop that long treated "day" as excluding weekend/holidays; identical term in same section should be given same meaning | Gov: The regulatory rule governs only regulatory deadlines; voluntary departure is a substantive duty (can be performed any day), so rollover rationale inapplicable; no reason to treat filing deadlines and departure periods the same | Court: Regulatory background and Congress’s contemporaneous enactment of related filing deadlines in §304 support applying the specialized meaning; procedural/substantive distinction not reflected in text or regulatory history and fails to overcome presumption |
Key Cases Cited
- Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280 (1981) (when Congress enacts a statute against longstanding administrative construction, courts presume the statute works in harmony with that construction)
- United States v. Hill, 506 U.S. 546 (1993) (reliance on administrative practice in construing statutory terms)
- FDIC v. Philadelphia Gear Corp., 476 U.S. 426 (1986) (deference to longstanding administrative practice in statutory interpretation)
- Dada v. Mukasey, 554 U.S. 1 (2008) (explaining voluntary departure and its consequences)
- Nasrallah v. Barr, 590 U.S. 573 (2020) (definition and scope of a "final order of removal" for §1252 review)
- Powerex Corp. v. Reliant Energy Servs., Inc., 551 U.S. 224 (2007) (identical words in the same statute normally have the same meaning)
- Calcano‑Martinez v. INS, 533 U.S. 348 (2001) (scope of court of appeals review of final orders of removal)
- Steel Co. v. Citizens for Better Environment, 523 U.S. 83 (1998) (party invoking federal jurisdiction bears the burden to establish it)