Monroe v. Commissioner of Social Security
676 F. App'x 5
| 2d Cir. | 2017Background
- Plaintiff Cindy Monroe applied for disability insurance benefits, alleging disability from bipolar disorder; ALJ denied benefits, district court affirmed, Monroe appealed to Second Circuit.
- ALJ found Monroe retained an RFC to perform a full range of work at all exertional levels and gave little weight to treating psychiatrist Dr. Wolkoff’s medical source statement.
- Dr. Wolkoff’s medical source statement asserted substantial off-task time and poor stress/public interaction tolerance; his treatment notes often described Monroe’s mood as "stable" or "good," and documented recreational activities (e.g., snowmobiling, horseback riding, cruises).
- Monroe argued the ALJ erred by (1) failing to give controlling weight to the treating physician under the treating-physician rule and (2) rendering an RFC unsupported by substantial evidence because no competent medical opinion supported it.
- The ALJ explained her reasons for discounting Dr. Wolkoff’s opinion (internal inconsistencies and contradictions with his own contemporaneous notes); she relied on those notes and the record to craft the RFC.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether ALJ erred by not giving controlling weight to treating physician under the treating-physician rule | Monroe: ALJ should have given Dr. Wolkoff’s opinion controlling weight | Commissioner: Dr. Wolkoff’s opinion conflicted with his own notes and other substantial evidence, so ALJ permissibly discounted it | ALJ did not err; substantial evidence supported discounting the treating opinion |
| Whether RFC is supported by substantial evidence after rejecting treating opinion | Monroe: With treating opinion rejected, no competent medical support for RFC | Commissioner: ALJ may base RFC on available treatment notes and other record evidence without a formal RFC opinion | RFC was supported; ALJ reasonably relied on contemporaneous treatment notes and record |
| Whether ALJ needed to obtain additional medical evidence before assessing RFC | Monroe: ALJ should have sought more medical input after rejecting treating opinion | Commissioner: No obvious gaps; ALJ had a complete medical history and was not required to further develop record | No duty to obtain more evidence where record was complete |
| Whether ALJ’s characterization of state psychologist’s conclusion was reversible error | Monroe: ALJ misstated state psychologist as finding inconsistency with treating opinion | Commissioner: Any mischaracterization was harmless given lack of prejudice | Any error was harmless and did not affect the outcome |
Key Cases Cited
- Burgess v. Astrue, 537 F.3d 117 (2d Cir. 2008) (standard for weighing treating-physician opinions and requirement to give reasons for assigned weight)
- Moran v. Astrue, 569 F.3d 108 (2d Cir. 2009) (definition of substantial evidence)
- Veino v. Barnhart, 312 F.3d 578 (2d Cir. 2002) (ALJ resolves genuine conflicts in medical evidence)
- Halloran v. Barnhart, 362 F.3d 28 (2d Cir. 2004) (limitations on controlling weight for treating physician opinions)
- Tankisi v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., [citation="521 F. App'x 29"] (2d Cir. 2013) (ALJ may assess RFC from the record when sufficient evidence exists without a formal RFC opinion)
- Rosa v. Callahan, 168 F.3d 72 (2d Cir. 1999) (no obligation to seek additional evidence where record is complete)
- Zabala v. Astrue, 595 F.3d 402 (2d Cir. 2010) (harmless-error doctrine in Social Security appeals)
- Greek v. Colvin, 802 F.3d 370 (2d Cir. 2015) (ALJ must not substitute her own expertise for medical opinions)