Monique Wilkerson v. Thedious Seymour
2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 22058
| 11th Cir. | 2013Background
- Wilkerson was at a sports bar; DJs announced her car was blocking someone. She went out after paying her tab and encountered Officer Seymour (off-duty, in uniform), who asked her to move the car. She refused, raised her voice, used the words “hell” and “damn,” and asked for his name and badge; Seymour then arrested her for violating Dekalb County disorderly conduct ordinance.
- Seymour claimed she was loud, cursed, and he warned her to stop before arresting her. Wilkerson says no one else was present and that her comments were not directed at Seymour.
- Sergeant Parker arrived ~3 minutes after the arrest, spoke briefly with Seymour and Wilkerson, and did not run a criminal-history check; Wilkerson was transported, jailed overnight, and later completed diversion so charges were not pursued.
- Wilkerson sued both officers under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for false arrest; both moved for qualified immunity at summary judgment and the district court denied both motions.
- On interlocutory appeal, the Eleventh Circuit reviewed de novo whether each officer was entitled to qualified immunity based on whether there was (arguable) probable cause and, for Parker, whether a duty to intervene arose from his post-arrest involvement.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Seymour had arguable probable cause to arrest for Dekalb County disorderly conduct | Wilkerson: Seymour lacked arguable probable cause because her loud speech did not show intent to insult, degrade, or incite others (prong two) and no crowd was present | Seymour: Officers need not know legal elements; two of three prongs (loud, public) suffice for probable cause | Held: No arguable probable cause; disputed facts about intent/insult/incitement and lack of crowd preclude qualified immunity for Seymour |
| Whether Parker is liable for failing to intervene in a false arrest | Wilkerson: Parker arrived, briefly investigated, and should have halted detention once he learned facts showing no basis for arrest | Parker: No clearly established duty to intervene in such circumstances; he reasonably relied on Seymour’s account and lacked information showing unconstitutionality | Held: Parker entitled to qualified immunity; he was not present for arrest, had limited information, and could rely on Seymour’s account |
| Proper standard for qualified immunity when speech is involved | Wilkerson: Arrest without probable cause violates Fourth Amendment; officers must consider statutory elements, including intent to insult/incite | Seymour: Arguable probable cause suffices; officers may be mistaken about elements | Held: Arguable probable cause requires adequate information to support elements; cannot arrest for mere unwanted or loud speech protecting constitutional rights |
| Whether a supervisor must conduct an independent on-scene investigation before permitting detention to continue | Wilkerson: Supervisor should investigate and intervene if arrest lacked constitutional basis | Parker: No constitutional requirement to perform full on-scene investigation for conduct he did not observe | Held: No duty to perform a full investigation; supervisor may rely on arresting officer’s account absent facts putting him on notice of lack of probable cause |
Key Cases Cited
- Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511 (establishing interlocutory appeal of qualified immunity denials)
- Maggio v. Sipple, 211 F.3d 1346 (Eleventh Circuit: de novo review of qualified immunity denial)
- Keating v. City of Miami, 598 F.3d 753 (qualified immunity framework: clearly established rights and discretionary action)
- Redd v. City of Enterprise, 140 F.3d 1378 (arrest without probable cause violates Fourth Amendment; arguable probable cause standard)
- Von Stein v. Brescher, 904 F.2d 572 (definition of arguable probable cause)
- Lee v. Ferraro, 284 F.3d 1188 (probable cause standard defined)
- Brown v. City of Huntsville, 608 F.3d 724 (probable-cause analysis requires examining statutory elements against known facts)
- Jones v. Cannon, 174 F.3d 1271 (limits and possibilities of non-arresting officer liability; duty-to-intervene discussion)
- Durruthy v. Pastor, 351 F.3d 1080 (arrest may be for a different crime than charged but must have arguable probable cause for some offense)
- Ensley v. Soper, 142 F.3d 1402 (duty to intervene in present constitutional violations such as excessive force)