Mondaca-Vega v. Holder
2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 21907
9th Cir.2015Background
- Petitioner claimed U.S. citizenship as Reynaldo Mondaca Carlon but had long used the name Salvador Mondaca-Vega; two authentic birth certificates exist (one Mexican, one California) and petitioner produced a U.S. passport and had family members’ status adjusted based on his asserted citizenship.
- Federal records show multiple interactions with immigration and criminal authorities in the 1950s–60s under various names, deportations and voluntary departures under the name Salvador Mondaca‑Vega, and fingerprint matches tying past immigration records to the petitioner.
- District court conducted a bench trial after this Court transferred the case under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(5)(B); it found petitioner carried his initial burden (passport, family adjustments), shifted the burden to the government, and concluded the government met the burden by “clear, unequivocal, and convincing” evidence, primarily discrediting petitioner’s testimony.
- Petitioner argued that (1) the government’s burden in an alienage determination should be the criminal standard (“beyond a reasonable doubt”) or at least higher than ordinary civil intermediate proof; and (2) this Court must review the district court’s factual findings de novo rather than for clear error.
- The en banc majority held that “clear, unequivocal, and convincing” is the ordinary civil intermediate (clear and convincing) standard, not a criminal‑level standard, and that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a)’s clear‑error review applies to the district court’s factual findings; the petition for review was denied.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Proper quantum of proof for government in alienage determinations | "Clear, unequivocal, and convincing" means a higher standard (approaching beyond a reasonable doubt); word "unequivocal" matters | The phrase is judicial phrasing of the intermediate civil standard (clear and convincing); "unequivocal" is not a separate, higher tier | The phrase denotes the familiar intermediate civil standard (clear and convincing), not beyond a reasonable doubt; district court did not err in using it |
| Standard of appellate review of district court factfindings in §1252(b)(5)(B) alienage hearings | Appellate court should review ultimate factual conclusions de novo (analogous to denaturalization cases and Baumgartner/Lim) | Rule 52(a) governs: findings of fact are reviewable only for clear error; Baumgartner’s independent review does not apply here | Apply clear‑error review under Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a); no de novo review of district court facts; Lim’s independent‑review principle rejected |
| Sufficiency of the government’s evidence that petitioner is non‑citizen | Petitioner argued government failed to rebut his proof (passport, family adjustments) by the proper high standard | Government relied on deportation records, sworn statements, fingerprints, and credibility findings to rebut petitioner’s proof | On clear‑error review, the district court’s adverse credibility findings and reliance on documentary and fingerprint evidence were permissible; government met the intermediate burden |
| Whether ‘‘unequivocal’’ requires a distinct higher intermediate standard | Petitioner: ‘‘unequivocal’’ adds meaning that raises burden above typical "clear and convincing" | Majority: Supreme Court usage treats the phrases interchangeably; creating a fourth tier is untenable and unnecessary | Court rejected treating "unequivocal" as producing a distinct, higher burden; regarded it as an adjective within the intermediate standard |
Key Cases Cited
- Woodby v. INS, 385 U.S. 276 (1966) (describing "clear, unequivocal, and convincing" as an intermediate civil standard in citizenship context)
- Baumgartner v. United States, 322 U.S. 665 (1944) (applied independent appellate review in denaturalization context; ultimate finding reviewed closely)
- Schneiderman v. United States, 320 U.S. 118 (1943) (protecting citizenship: proof must be "clear, unequivocal, and convincing" and not leave issue in doubt)
- Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 (1979) (describing intermediate standards and noting adjectives like "unequivocal" are used in such contexts)
- Pullman‑Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273 (1982) (emphasizing Rule 52(a) and rejecting categorical exceptions to clear‑error review)
- Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564 (1985) (clarifying clear‑error standard and limits on de novo review of factual findings)
- Teva Pharm. USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 831 (2015) (affirming that subsidiary factual findings are reviewed for clear error under Rule 52(a))
- Lim v. Mitchell, 431 F.2d 197 (9th Cir. 1970) (applied independent review in an alienage determination; the en banc majority here overruled Lim’s continued vitality)
- Lee Hon Lung v. Dulles, 261 F.2d 719 (9th Cir. 1958) (applying intermediate standard where claimant relied on prior government recognition)
- Chau v. INS, 247 F.3d 1026 (9th Cir. 2001) (describing burden shifting and rebuttable presumption of alienage in face of foreign‑birth evidence)