Moncier v. Jones
939 F. Supp. 2d 854
M.D. Tenn.2013Background
- Moncier filed a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action against the State of Tennessee and Nancy S. Jones arising from a Tennessee attorney disciplinary proceeding.
- The Tennessee Supreme Court affirmed a hearing-panel judgment imposing an eleven-month, twenty-nine day suspension with most of it probated.
- Plaintiff alleged First, Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendment violations during the disciplinary process and sought monetary damages.
- The State was not alleged to have committed acts, and both defendants were not served until March 28, 2012.
- Defendant Jones moved to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1)/(6); Plaintiff amended the complaint, then failed to respond to the dismissal motion.
- The court later dismissed the amended complaint on absolute immunity grounds and held the State was not a proper § 1983 defendant; subsequent motions sought Rule 60(b) relief and leave to amend, all denied.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the State is a proper § 1983 defendant | State is a 'person' for declaratory/ prospective relief. | State is not a person suable under § 1983. | State not suable; claim against State barred as a matter of law. |
| Whether Jones has absolute immunity to shield dismissal | Relief sought against Jones on constitutional grounds should proceed. | Jones enjoys absolute immunity for prosecutorial/official acts. | Amended complaint dismissed based on absolute immunity; official-capacity claims barred. |
| Whether Rule 60(b) relief is warranted for alleged CM/ECF notice failures | CM/ECF notifications were inactivated by plaintiff’s system after suspension; relief warranted. | Not excusable neglect; plaintiff failed to monitor the docket. | Rule 60(b)(1) relief denied; neglect not excusable. |
| Whether filing a second amended complaint would state a plausible claim | Second amended complaint would add broader injunctive relief against Tennessee. | Amendment would be futile; pleadings deficient and conclusory. | Denied; amendment would be futile and fail to state a plausible claim. |
| Whether there is a case or controversy/standing for injunctive relief against Jones or the State | Plaintiff seeks injunctive and declaratory relief on ongoing disciplinary processes. | Moot because Jones is no longer Chief Disciplinary Counsel; no live dispute. | No injury-in-fact or ongoing dispute; claims for injunctive relief are moot. |
Key Cases Cited
- Lyons v. City of Los Angeles, 461 U.S. 95 (1983) (standing and irreparable injury in injunction contexts)
- Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, 491 U.S. 58 (1989) (state not a 'person' under § 1983; Eleventh Amendment considerations)
- Pioneer Investment Servs. Co. v. Brunswick Assocs., Ltd. P'ship, 507 U.S. 380 (1993) (excusable neglect factors for Rule 60(b))
- Yeschick v. Mineta, 675 F.3d 622 (6th Cir. 2012) (duty to monitor docket; lack of diligence defeats Rule 60(b)(1) relief)
- Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) (pleading standards; plausibility requirements)
- Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) (plausibility standard for pleading claims)
- Rose v. Hartford Underwriters Ins. Co., 203 F.3d 417 (6th Cir. 2000) (ample grounds for denial of Rule 60(b) relief when not meritorious)
- Somers Coal Co. v. United States, 2 F.R.D. 532 (N.D. Ohio 1942) (limitations on special findings and trial rulings; early context for Rule 52/a)