Molina v. Aurora Loan Services, LLC
635 F. App'x 618
11th Cir.2015Background
- Molina took a $444,000 mortgage (2007), defaulted (Nov. 2007), and a Florida state court entered a final foreclosure judgment (Feb. 2009) that she did not appeal.
- The foreclosure sale was repeatedly postponed; Aurora purchased the property at a public sale on Jan. 9, 2013. Molina sought to vacate the sale but state court denied relief.
- Molina applied for post-judgment loan modifications (beginning 2012) with Aurora and later Nationstar, alleging discriminatory conduct during that process based on race, age, and language.
- Molina sued in state court (Mar. 2014) asserting claims under ECOA, FHA, TARP, HAMP, and Florida’s FDUTPA and sought injunctive relief plus damages; defendants removed to federal court.
- The district court dismissed the case with prejudice for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction under Rooker-Feldman and did not reach Rule 12(b)(6) arguments; Molina appealed.
- The Eleventh Circuit found federal jurisdiction over Molina’s post-judgment discrimination claims but evaluated the merits and affirmed dismissal of some claims, reversed others, and remanded with instructions about prejudice and amendment.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Rooker–Feldman bars federal jurisdiction | Molina: she challenges post-judgment conduct (loan-modification discrimination), not the foreclosure judgment | Defs: claims are inextricably intertwined with the state foreclosure judgment and thus barred | Rooker–Feldman does not bar Molina’s post-judgment discrimination claims because they arose after the state judgment and could not have been raised earlier; claims seeking to set aside the foreclosure remain barred |
| Whether Anti‑Injunction Act deprives federal court of jurisdiction to award relief | Molina sought injunctive relief to stop removal/execution | Defs: injunction would improperly enjoin state-court proceedings/execution | Anti‑Injunction Act does not strip subject‑matter jurisdiction; it only limits equitable relief. Court can adjudicate damages claims but may be barred from granting injunctive relief against state proceedings |
| Whether Molina stated actionable federal or statutory claims (ECOA, FHA, TARP, HAMP) | Molina: denial of modification and alleged discriminatory remarks support ECOA, FHA, and TARP/HAMP claims | Defs: refusal to modify a delinquent/defaulted loan is not an "adverse action" under ECOA; no private right of action under HAMP/TARP; FHA allegations are insufficiently pleaded | ECOA claim dismissed with prejudice (no actionable adverse action). HAMP and TARP dismissed with prejudice (no private right). FHA claim dismissed for failure to plead plausible discriminatory intent but dismissed without prejudice to amend |
| Whether FDUTPA claim was sufficiently pleaded | Molina: corporate statements and denial of modification amount to deceptive/unfair practices causing harm | Defs: statements were not likely to deceive a reasonable consumer; causation/damages not pled | FDUTPA claim dismissed without prejudice for failure to allege deceptive practice and causation plausibly |
| Whether dismissal with prejudice and denial of hearing were proper | Molina: dismissal with prejudice improper; requested hearing | Defs: district court concluded jurisdictional defects made amendment futile; no hearing necessary | Dismissal with prejudice was improper for claims dismissed for lack of jurisdiction (those must be without prejudice). District court did not abuse discretion in declining a hearing; Molina did not request one below and none was required |
Key Cases Cited
- Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280 (2005) (limits Rooker–Feldman to state‑court losers seeking federal review of state judgments)
- Skinner v. Switzer, 562 U.S. 521 (2011) (federal courts may hear independent federal claims even if related to state proceedings)
- McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973) (burden‑shifting framework for employment/disparate treatment claims applied in discrimination analyses)
- Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) (plausibility standard for pleading)
- Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) (Twombly pleading standard requiring factual plausibility)
- Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273 (2002) (private right of action requires clear congressional intent)
- Miller v. Chase Home Finance, LLC, 677 F.3d 1113 (11th Cir. 2012) (no private right of action under HAMP)