925 F.3d 124
3rd Cir.2019Background
- Mohamed Sambare, a lawful permanent resident, pleaded guilty in Pennsylvania to driving under the influence of a Schedule I controlled substance (marijuana) after a 2015 traffic stop and positive drug test.
- DHS initiated removal proceedings, asserting removability under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i) as a controlled-substance-related conviction not covered by the small-quantity marijuana exception.
- The Immigration Court found Sambare removable; the BIA affirmed, reasoning the DUI conviction “encompasses more than simply ingesting marijuana for personal use” and is aimed at protecting public safety.
- Sambare sought review, arguing his conviction falls within the statutory exception for “a single offense involving possession for one’s own use of 30 grams or less of marijuana.”
- The Third Circuit considered whether to apply the categorical approach and whether the word “involving” should be read broadly enough to include a DUI conviction within the possession-for-personal-use exception.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Sambare’s PA DUI conviction qualifies as “a single offense involving possession for one’s own use of 30 grams or less of marijuana” under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i) | Sambare: "Involving" should be read to cover offenses tied to small-quantity personal possession, so his marijuana-related DUI falls within the exception | DHS/BIA: The DUI is more serious and distinct from simple possession; it targets public-safety risks and thus falls outside the small-quantity possession exception | Court held the DUI conviction does not fall within the small-quantity possession exception; BIA decision affirmed |
| Whether the categorical (or modified categorical) approach applies to decide if the conviction "involves" small-quantity possession | Sambare: Apply the categorical approach to compare elements and determine fit | DHS/BIA: The statutory phrase is specific and not suited to the categorical approach; court may look to statutory text and common-sense meaning | Court held categorical/modified categorical approach inapplicable here; courts should rely on statutory text and commonsense meaning |
Key Cases Cited
- Rojas v. Attorney Gen., 728 F.3d 203 (3d Cir.) (describing the categorical and modified categorical approaches)
- Borrome v. Attorney Gen., 687 F.3d 150 (3d Cir.) (courts retain jurisdiction to determine whether statutory jurisdiction-stripping facts are present)
- Denis v. Attorney Gen., 633 F.3d 201 (3d Cir.) (standard of review for BIA legal determinations)
- Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984) (framework for judicial deference to agency interpretations)
- Carachuri-Rosendo v. Holder, 560 U.S. 563 (2010) (principles of statutory interpretation and commonsense textual reading)
- Descamps v. United States, 570 U.S. 254 (2013) (limits of the categorical and modified categorical approaches)
- Commonwealth v. Griffith, 32 A.3d 1231 (Pa.) (describing DUI statutory framework focusing on impaired ability to drive)