44 F.4th 867
9th Cir.2022Background
- Student Mohamed Sabra (Muslim) took an online Scottsdale Community College World Politics course module titled "Islamic Terrorism" taught by Dr. Nicholas Damask; module materials (PowerPoints, assigned reading excerpt, and a required 25-question multiple-choice quiz) were attached to the complaint.
- PowerPoint slides and assigned excerpt presented contested claims linking Islamic doctrine and history to terrorism; five quiz items graded students on answers that Sabra says conflicted with his religious beliefs; Sabra lost points after answering according to his faith.
- Sabra and CAIR-AZ sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 raising Establishment Clause and Free Exercise Clause claims against Damask (individual capacity) and Monell/municipal-liability claims against Maricopa County Community College District.
- The district court dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6); it found CAIR-AZ lacked organizational standing, refused Sabra’s First Amendment claims on the merits, and held Damask qualified for qualified immunity. Plaintiffs appealed.
- Ninth Circuit: (1) held CAIR-AZ has organizational standing (Havens framework); (2) affirmed dismissal of municipal-liability claim—both because plaintiffs abandoned the claim on appeal and because the complaint failed to plausibly plead Monell liability; (3) affirmed qualified immunity for Damask on Establishment and Free Exercise claims because the rights were not "clearly established."
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Organizational standing (CAIR-AZ) | CAIR-AZ diverted resources to develop a public-awareness campaign rebutting course material; that diversion is an Article III injury. | Defendants: such diversion is part of CAIR-AZ’s ordinary advocacy and not a cognizable injury. | CAIR-AZ has standing under Havens: alleged diversion of resources to counteract the conduct suffices at pleading stage. |
| Municipal (Monell) liability against College District | District liable because Damask taught course for 24 years, served as department chair/final policymaker, and District had constructive knowledge/condoned material. | District: plaintiffs failed to plead municipal policy, widespread custom, ratification, or that Damask was a final policymaker. | Plaintiffs abandoned the claim on appeal; alternatively, complaint failed to plausibly plead Monell (no alleged widespread practice, delegation, or ratification). |
| Establishment Clause (Damask) | Course/module communicated disapproval/hostility toward Islam and advanced religion-inhibiting message. | Damask: academic freedom and pedagogical context; no clearly established precedent holding such classroom speech unconstitutional. | Qualified immunity: right not "clearly established"—no controlling precedent put Damask on notice; court did not decide merits. |
| Free Exercise Clause (Damask) | Quiz coerced Sabra to disavow his religion (answer contrary to beliefs) or suffer grade penalty—substantial burden on religious exercise. | Damask: quiz tested comprehension, not compelled belief; no clearly established rule that such testing imposes a substantial burden; academic freedom. | Qualified immunity: right not clearly established in these specific circumstances; dismissal affirmed without resolving merits. |
Key Cases Cited
- Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363 (1982) (organization may have standing when defendant’s conduct frustrates its mission and causes diversion of resources)
- Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978) (municipal liability requires injury caused by municipal policy, custom, or final policymaker)
- Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971) (Establishment Clause test examining purpose, effect, and excessive entanglement)
- Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992) (Article III injury-in-fact requirements)
- Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469 (1986) (municipal liability via final policymaker action)
- Board of Commissioners v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397 (1997) (custom/policy liability requires practice so widespread as to have force of law)
- City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112 (1988) (ratification and final policymaker standards for municipal liability)
- Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731 (2011) (qualified immunity two-prong test; clearly established standard)
- Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223 (2009) (courts may decide order of qualified-immunity prongs)
- District of Columbia v. Wesby, 138 S. Ct. 577 (2018) (doctrine: avoid defining clearly established law at high level of generality)
- Fair Housing Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommate.com, LLC, 666 F.3d 1216 (9th Cir. 2012) (organizational standing where defendant’s actions caused diversion of resources to non-litigation advocacy)
- C.F. ex rel. Farnan v. Capistrano Unified Sch. Dist., 654 F.3d 975 (9th Cir. 2011) (no reported case held that teacher’s classroom statements hostile to religion violated Establishment Clause; qualified immunity discussion)