Moats v. State, 168 A.3d 952

Background

In January 2015 Moats (18) was arrested on drug-distribution charges after admitting he provided Suboxone and marijuana to other teens; police seized his cell phone incident to that arrest and retained it after his release.
Two days after release an investigator (Sergeant Zimmerman) applied for and obtained a warrant to search the phone; the affidavit recited admissions, witness interviews describing drug distribution and an ongoing sexual-assault investigation, and the affiant’s training/experience including a statement that participants in such crimes communicate via cell phones.
The warrant authorized a broad forensic search of “any and all” electronic data on the phone (calls, texts, photos, e‑mail, external media) without a temporal limitation; a District Court judge issued the warrant the same day.
Forensic examination uncovered sexually explicit photos and a video of Moats’s 15‑year‑old girlfriend; Moats was convicted (agreed facts) of possession of child pornography and sentenced.
Moats moved to suppress, arguing the post‑release retention was unlawful and the warrant lacked probable cause (and nexus) to search the phone; the suppression court, Court of Special Appeals, and Maryland Court of Appeals upheld the search.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (Moats)	Defendant's Argument (State)	Held
Continued retention of phone after release	Retention after release violated Fourth Amendment because no probable cause that phone contained evidence at time of release	Phone lawfully seized incident to arrest; Riley permits securing phone pending warrant and holding while officers seek a warrant	Held: retention was lawful; police may hold phone seized incident to a lawful arrest as long as reasonably necessary to obtain a warrant
Probable cause / nexus to search phone	Affidavit lacked specific facts linking phone to alleged crimes; officer’s general statement that participants use phones insufficient to show nexus	Affidavit’s totality (admissions, witness accounts, nature of crimes, affiant’s training) supports common‑sense inference that communications/evidence would be on the phone	Held: warrant satisfied the substantial‑basis standard; judge had probable cause to authorize search of phone
Good‑faith exception	Sought suppression; argued probable‑cause deficiency meant exclusion	State argued warrant was supported or, alternatively, officers acted in good faith relying on warrant	Court did not address because it resolved probable cause in State’s favor (but Court of Special Appeals had alternatively applied Leon good‑faith)
Particularity / breadth of digital search (concurring view)	Implicit concern that warrant authorizing search of all phone data without temporal limits is overbroad and threatens Fourth Amendment particularity	State did not heavily contest in majority; majority emphasized deference and totality of circumstances	Concurrence: would not find probable cause on that record and would instead affirm under Leon; recommends temporal limits on phone warrants to satisfy particularity

Key Cases Cited

Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373 (2014) (police may seize cell phone incident to arrest but generally require a warrant to search its digital contents)
Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983) (probable cause assessed under the totality of the circumstances; magistrate must have a substantial basis for finding a fair probability of evidence)
United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984) (good‑faith exception to exclusionary rule for objectively reasonable reliance on a warrant)
United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1 (1977) (seizure of mobile container permissible on probable cause, but warrant required absent exigency to search its contents)
United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696 (1983) (scope and duration of detention of luggage for investigative purposes constrained by Fourth Amendment)
Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366 (2003) (practical, nontechnical probable‑cause standard; courts should give deference to common‑sense judgments)