Mitchell v. Wall, 808 F.3d 1174

Background

Roy Mitchell, a transgender-identifying person, sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 after release from Wisconsin prison, alleging deliberate indifference to her gender dysphoria by prison doctors/administrators and probation officers.
Mitchell sought damages and a preliminary injunction forcing probation officers to allow her to live with her family, dress as a woman in public, and refer her for gender-dysphoria counseling/treatment.
The district court screened the complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), permitted claims to proceed only against two prison doctors, dismissed other defendants, and denied the preliminary injunction as unrelated to the surviving claims and for failure to show likelihood of success or irreparable harm.
While the appeal of the injunction denial was pending, Mitchell was reincarcerated and thus not on probation; the appeal concerning probation-officer relief became moot.
The Seventh Circuit explained that although mootness normally results in vacatur of the lower court’s judgment, vacatur is not routinely required for preliminary injunctions that become moot; here the case still had live claims against the doctors, and the plaintiff could renew probation-related relief if released and placed back on probation.
The court also held Mitchell waived any request to vacate the district court’s order by failing to move for vacatur when the appeal became moot (citing Munsingwear and Gjertsen principles).

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether denial of preliminary injunction should be reviewed on appeal despite plaintiff’s reincarceration	Mitchell argued she should get injunction modifying probation conditions to permit family residence, female presentation, and treatment referrals	Defendants argued appeal was moot because Mitchell was in custody and not subject to probation supervision	Appeal dismissed as moot; injunction relief relating to probation is unavailable while plaintiff is jailed
Whether district court’s denial of preliminary injunction should be vacated upon mootness on appeal	Mitchell (implicitly) sought vacatur to avoid preclusive effect of district court denial	Defendants relied on precedent that vacatur is discretionary and not required for preliminary injunctions; plaintiff failed to seek vacatur timely	Court declined vacatur, noting preliminary-injunction orders typically need not be vacated and plaintiff waived vacatur by not moving for it
Whether the denial of preliminary injunction precludes future relief if plaintiff is later on probation	Mitchell argued denial should not bar future challenges	Defendants argued denial is final as to that request	Court held denial does not preclude later issuance of a permanent injunction or a renewed motion if Mitchell is later on probation; the case against the doctors remains live
Whether mootness requires vacatur to prevent res judicata/collateral estoppel	Mitchell argued vacatur necessary to protect her rights	Defendants argued no vacatur is required and plaintiff waived it	Court applied Munsingwear/Gjertsen: vacatur serves the loser’s benefit but can be waived; Mitchell waived by failing to invoke vacatur

Key Cases Cited

United States v. Munsingwear, Inc., 340 U.S. 36 (1950) (moot appeals ordinarily result in vacatur of the lower-court judgment to avoid preclusive effects)
Orion Sales, Inc. v. Emerson Radio Corp., 148 F.3d 840 (7th Cir. 1998) (preliminary-injunction orders that become moot on appeal need not typically be vacated)
Transportation Workers Union of America v. Transportation Workers Union of America, 732 F.3d 832 (7th Cir. 2013) (mootness doctrine applied where requested relief no longer practicable)
Gjertsen v. Board of Election Commissioners, 751 F.2d 199 (7th Cir. 1984) (discussing waiver of vacatur under Munsingwear)
Camreta v. Greene, 563 U.S. 692 (2011) (addressing mootness, collateral consequences, and circumstances for review)