Missouri v. McNeely
133 S. Ct. 1552
| SCOTUS | 2013Background
- McNeely was stopped for speeding and crossing the centerline at about 2:08 a.m.
- He refused to submit to a breath test and was transported to a hospital for blood testing.
- A police officer did not obtain a warrant before directing a lab to draw McNeely's blood.
- The blood test produced a BAC of 0.154%, well above the 0.08% limit.
- McNeely challenged the blood draw as a Fourth Amendment violation, arguing no exigency justified a warrantless test.
- Missouri Supreme Court affirmed, applying a per se exigency rule based on BAC dissipation; certiorari was granted to resolve the issue.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether natural BAC dissipation creates a per se exigency | McNeely argues dissipation is a per se emergency justifying a warrantless draw. | Missouri contends exigeny exists inherently due to BAC evanescence, warrantless draw justified. | No per se exigency; case-by-case analysis required. |
| Whether totality-of-circumstances governs exigency in drunk-driving blood draws | Totality approach allows consideration of all factors delaying warrants. | A per se rule is unnecessary; facts determine reasonableness. | Exigency must be determined by totality of circumstances, not a blanket rule. |
| Is obtaining a warrant preferable when feasible without undermining evidence | Warrants should be pursued if they do not significantly undermine timely BAC evidence. | In some cases, delay to obtain a warrant risks loss of evidence and is impractical. | Warrants should be sought when feasible; no automatic per se rule. |
| How strong is the privacy interest in a blood draw in drunk-driving cases | Blood testing is routine and minimally invasive; privacy interests are modest. | Intrusion into the body implicates substantial privacy interests; warrantless draws are not automatically permissible. | Compelled intrusions implicate significant privacy interests; must respect warrant requirements absent exigent circumstances. |
| Do technological developments in warrant procedures affect the analysis | Yes: faster and remote warrants undermine a broad per se rule; case-by-case analysis remains appropriate. |
Key Cases Cited
- Missouri v. McNeely, 570 U.S. _ (U.S. Supreme Court (2013)) (drunk-driving blood draws require case-by-case exigency assessment)
- Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (U.S. Supreme Court (1966)) (warrantless blood test permissible where delay to obtain warrant threatened destruction of evidence)
- Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S. _ (U.S. Supreme Court (2011)) (exigent circumstances and totality-of-the-circumstances approach)
- Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398 (U.S. Supreme Court (2006)) (emergency aid/exigent circumstances framework)
- Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385 (U.S. Supreme Court (1997)) (case-specific exigency analysis; rejects broad per se rules)
- Cupp v. Murphy, 412 U.S. 291 (U.S. Supreme Court (1973)) (imminent destruction of evidence justifies limited search to preserve evidence)
- Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives’ Assn., 489 U.S. 602 (U.S. Supreme Court (1989)) (privacy interests in bodily intrusions; medical testing context)
- Robinson v. United States, 414 U.S. 218 (U.S. Supreme Court (1973)) (general warrant exception concepts; searches incident to lawful arrest)
- Wardlow v. Illinois, 528 U.S. 119 (U.S. Supreme Court (2000)) (fact-intensive review for reasonable suspicion stops; case-specific guidance)