662 F.Supp.3d 626
W.D. La.2023Background
- Missouri and Louisiana, joined by five private plaintiffs, sued President Biden and numerous federal agencies/officials alleging a coordinated campaign to pressure social-media companies to censor certain viewpoints, especially COVID‑19 and election-related speech.
- Plaintiffs claim government coercion/cooperation (meetings, flagging, threats to amend/withdraw Section 230, antitrust threats, formal requests) caused platforms to deplatform, shadow‑ban, de‑boost, label, and remove content and accounts.
- Causes of action: (1) First Amendment (government‑induced private censorship); (2) ultra vires/acts beyond statutory authority; and (3) Administrative Procedure Act claims against multiple agencies for unlawful agency action. Plaintiffs seek declaratory and injunctive relief.
- Defendants moved to dismiss under Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6), arguing lack of Article III standing, sovereign immunity, failure to plead state action or plausible claims, and that relief against the President is barred by separation of powers.
- The Court denied dismissal in large part: it found plaintiffs plausibly alleged injury‑in‑fact, traceability, and redressability; rejected sovereign‑immunity barriers for constitutional and ultra vires claims and allowed APA claims to proceed; but dismissed injunctive relief claims against the President (with prejudice) while leaving declaratory claims against him intact (denied without prejudice).
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Article III standing (injury, causation, redressability) | Plaintiffs allege concrete past, ongoing, and imminent censorship injuries to private plaintiffs and quasi‑sovereign/state interests; government pressure foreseeably caused platform actions; injunction against officials would redress harm. | Defendants say injuries are traceable to independent private platforms, not the government; past acts alone don't show imminent future injury; injunctions won't redress because platforms act independently; special solicitude inapplicable. | Court: Plaintiffs plausibly allege injury‑in‑fact, traceability (de facto causality/coercion allegations), and redressability; standing satisfied for States and private plaintiffs. Motion denied on standing. |
| Sovereign immunity / APA jurisdictional bars | Constitutional claims and ultra vires claims are exempt from sovereign immunity; APA waiver (5 U.S.C. §702) covers discrete agency actions and equitable relief—plaintiffs allege targeted, discrete agency coercion. | Defendants contend no waiver: plaintiffs challenge broad governmental speech/advice, not final agency actions; Section 702/704 finality not satisfied; claims are a blanket attack on policy. | Court: Sovereign immunity does not bar constitutional or ultra vires claims; Section 702 covers plaintiffs’ APA claims because they challenge discrete coercive agency actions and courts need not require formal finality here. Motion denied on sovereign immunity. |
| Failure to state First Amendment claim (state action) | Government engaged in coercion, significant encouragement, joint action/entwinement with platforms (meetings, flagging channels, threats re: Section 230/antitrust/regulation), plus subsidization/preemption effects of Section 230—together these convert private moderation into state action and amount to prior restraints/viewpoint discrimination. | Defendants argue platforms’ moderation is independent private action; communications/requests were routine persuasion, not coercive; Section 230 alone cannot create state action; pleading is conclusory and insufficient. | Court: Plaintiffs alleged sufficiently specific facts of coercion, entwinement, and combining features (including Section 230’s role) to plausibly attribute state action and to plead viewpoint discrimination and prior restraints. Motion denied on Rule 12(b)(6) for First Amendment claim. |
| Relief against the President (separation of powers) | Plaintiffs seek injunctive and declaratory relief against Biden to stop the alleged nationwide coercion; injunctive relief is extraordinary but possible if necessary to redress injury. | Defendants contend courts lack jurisdiction to enjoin the President in performance of official duties; injunctive relief against the President is barred or inappropriate; other officials are proper targets so presidential relief is unnecessary. | Court: Injunctive relief against the President dismissed with prejudice (separation‑of‑powers concerns and availability of relief against subordinate officials). Declaratory relief against the President not dismissed (denied without prejudice) due to unsettled authority. |
Key Cases Cited
- Spokeo v. Robins, 578 U.S. 330 (2016) (standing requires concrete and particularized injury)
- Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992) (elements of Article III standing; redressability/traceability principles)
- Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007) (states afforded "special solicitude" in standing analysis)
- Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154 (1997) (causation/de facto causality in standing/redressability)
- Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908) (constitutional claims against officials not barred by sovereign immunity for injunctive relief)
- Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Com. Corp., 337 U.S. 682 (1949) (ultra vires exception to sovereign immunity)
- Skinner v. Ry. Lab. Execs' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602 (1989) (private conduct immunized or authorized by federal law can suggest state action when government entwinement is present)
- Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58 (1963) (government warnings/threats to private distributors can constitute coercive prior restraint)
- Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455 (1973) (state may not induce or encourage private discrimination; tangible aid/preemption can create state action)
- Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991 (1982) ("significant encouragement" doctrine for attributing private conduct to the state)
- Backpage.com, LLC v. Dart, 807 F.3d 229 (7th Cir. 2015) (public officials who threaten or coerce third‑party intermediaries implicate the First Amendment)
- Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622 (1994) (private gatekeepers over mass communication channels raise First Amendment concerns and potential for abuse)
- Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) (plausibility standard for factual allegations)
- Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) (plausibility and pleading requirements)
- Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976) (prior restraint is a severe First Amendment violation)