Miriam Grussgott v. Milwaukee Jewish Day School, I
882 F.3d 655
7th Cir.2018Background
- Miriam Grussgott, a Hebrew/Jewish-studies teacher at Milwaukee Jewish Day School, was hired in 2013 and rehired for 2014–15; she had prior religious teaching experience and taught from the Tal Am integrated Hebrew/Jewish curriculum.
- The school is a private non-Orthodox Jewish day school with daily prayer, a staff rabbi, chapel and Torah scrolls, but it does not require teachers to be Jewish and has an antidiscrimination policy.
- Grussgott underwent treatment for a brain tumor in 2013, suffered cognitive/memory issues, and returned to work in 2014; after an incident in 2015 involving a parent and an email from her husband, the school terminated her employment.
- Grussgott sued under the Americans with Disabilities Act alleging termination because of disability; the school moved for summary judgment invoking the First Amendment ministerial exception.
- The district court granted summary judgment for the school, concluding the school is a religious institution and Grussgott served a ministerial role; the Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding the ministerial exception barred the ADA claim.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the school is a religious institution eligible for the ministerial exception | School is not religiously characterful because it is non‑Orthodox, employs a rabbi in advisory capacity, and has nondiscrimination policy | School’s mission, prayer, rabbi, chapel, and integrated religious curriculum demonstrate religious character | School is a religious institution entitled to invoke the ministerial exception |
| Whether Grussgott’s job was ministerial | Grussgott says her teaching was cultural/historical, voluntary, and her title was a secular "grade school" or "Hebrew" teacher | School says she taught religious content, followed Tal Am curriculum, and was hired for Judaic teaching experience | Grussgott performed important religious functions and her role furthered the school’s religious mission; ministerial exception applies |
| Proper test for ministerial status | Plaintiff urges limiting ministerial scope (distinguish Hosanna‑Tabor teacher) | School and court apply totality-of-circumstances (Hosanna‑Tabor factors as guidance) | Court uses a fact‑intensive, totality‑of‑circumstances approach; Hosanna‑Tabor factors informative but not dispositive |
| Admissibility/value of plaintiff’s expert (legal opinion) | Plaintiff offered rabbinic law professor opining exception did not apply | Court treated the expert’s ultimate legal conclusion as impermissible legal opinion evidence | Court excluded the expert’s opinion as improper legal conclusion; exclusion was not an abuse of discretion |
Key Cases Cited
- Hosanna‑Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 565 U.S. 171 (establishing the ministerial exception and endorsing a fact‑intensive inquiry)
- Tomic v. Catholic Diocese of Peoria, 442 F.3d 1036 (religious‑organization nondiscrimination statements do not waive ministerial protection)
- Cannata v. Catholic Diocese of Austin, 700 F.3d 169 (courts must avoid rigid formulas; totality approach endorsed)
- Conlon v. InterVarsity Christian Fellowship, 777 F.3d 829 (Hosanna‑Tabor factors need not all be present for ministerial status)
- Fratello v. Archdiocese of N.Y., 863 F.3d 190 (application of Hosanna‑Tabor factors to lay school leaders)
- Alicea‑Hernandez v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 320 F.3d 698 (ministerial exception applies to employees performing important religious functions)
- Amos (Corp. of Presiding Bishop v. Amos), 483 U.S. 327 (government should not entangle itself in defining religious activity)
- Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228 (Establishment Clause prohibits favoring one denomination over another)
- School Dist. of Abington Twp. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (distinguishing "teaching religion" from "teaching about religion")