Minnesota Chamber of Commerce v. Choi, 707 F.Supp.3d 846

The Minnesota Chamber of Commerce challenged newly amended provisions of Minn. Stat. § 211B.15, set to take effect January 1, 2024, which prohibit certain business corporations with minimal foreign ownership (as little as 1%) from making political contributions or expenditures in state and local elections.
These restrictions include civil and criminal penalties and a compliance certification requirement for companies.
The Chamber argues that the provisions violate the First Amendment and are preempted by the Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA).
The Chamber sought and was granted a preliminary injunction to halt enforcement pending resolution of these claims.
The decision largely turns on whether the law was narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest and whether federal law preempts state regulation in this area.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
First Amendment: Prohibition on foreign-influenced corporations' political spending	Provisions are a categorical ban on protected speech not narrowly tailored to any compelling interest; restricts domestic corporations' speech due to minimal foreign ownership	Statute furthers compelling state interest to prevent foreign influence over elections; 1% threshold justified to prevent risks	For Chamber: Not narrowly tailored; over- and under-inclusive and not least restrictive means
Supremacy Clause / Express Preemption by FECA	State law is expressly preempted by FECA regarding federal elections and conflicts with Congress's scheme	FECA's express preemption applies only to federal offices; state can regulate state/local elections	For Defendant: FECA preempts only with respect to federal offices, not state/local elections
Conflict Preemption	State statute stands as obstacle to congressional regulation, impeding the uniform federal approach to foreign influence	No direct conflict; Congress intended states to regulate their own elections not preempted by FECA	For Defendant: No conflict preemption; statute regulates state interests
Irreparable Harm	Chamber’s members are chilled from engaging in speech, and loss of First Amendment rights constitutes irreparable harm	Delay in seeking injunction undercuts urgency; no ongoing harm	For Chamber: Five-month delay not dispositive; imminent enforcement sufficient for harm

Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010) (corporate political speech is protected under the First Amendment)
Bluman v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 565 U.S. 1104 (2012) (summary affirmance upholding ban on political spending by foreign nationals)
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (standards of scrutiny for political speech regulations)
McCutcheon v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 572 U.S. 185 (2014) (distinction between contributions and expenditures)
Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347 (1976) (loss of First Amendment freedoms constitutes irreparable injury)
Brown v. Ent. Merchs. Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786 (2011) (statutes must not be overinclusive in burdening constitutional rights)
Williams-Yulee v. Fla. Bar, 575 U.S. 433 (2015) (under- and over-inclusiveness undermine narrow tailoring)
Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387 (2012) (field and conflict preemption analysis under the Supremacy Clause)