Millicent Carvalho-Grevious v. Delaware State University, 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 4992

Background

Dr. Millicent Carvalho‑Grevious was hired as associate professor and chair of Social Work at Delaware State Univ. for a one‑year term (reappointment possible); she supervised reaccreditation efforts and reported to Dean Austin and Provost Thompson.
Early in her term she recommended personnel changes and received complaints from junior faculty/staff about her management; senior faculty/students gave some positive evaluations.
Beginning January–February 2011 Grevious complained to Provost Thompson that Dean Austin made discriminatory/sexist comments and was undermining her; she filed internal grievances (March) and an HR complaint (April 14).
On May 3 the University notified her she would be removed as chair effective May 6 (she continued to receive chair pay through term); on April 1 she had been given a renewable contract, but on June 21 the University revised it to a terminal contract ending May 25, 2012. Grevious filed EEOC charges and later suit alleging retaliation under Title VII and § 1981.
The District Court granted summary judgment for defendants relying on Nassar’s but‑for causation rule; the Third Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part: it affirmed dismissal of the chairperson claim but reversed as to the contract‑revision (terminal contract) claim against the University and Provost Thompson and remanded.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether Nassar requires but‑for causation at prima facie stage of Title VII retaliation	Grevious: prima facie requires only inference that protected activity was likely reason for adverse action	Defendants: Nassar requires but‑for causation at prima facie (so summary judgment appropriate)	Prima facie does not require but‑for; plaintiff must show evidence raising inference that protected activity was the likely reason.
Whether removal as chair (May 6) was retaliatory	Grevious: temporal proximity to HR complaint and prior negative evaluation show retaliation	Defendants: poor reaccreditation progress and management reasons justify early removal	Court: affirmed summary judgment for defendants—no reasonable juror could find protected activity was likely reason for chair removal.
Whether issuance of revised terminal contract (June 21) was retaliatory	Grevious: contract went from renewable to terminal soon after EEOC charge; alleged provost admission supports causation and pretext	Defendants: decision based on longstanding collegiality problems; renewable contract was not final	Court: reversed district court—sufficient evidence (timing + alleged admission + lack of performance change) to survive summary judgment; remand for trial as to Univ. and Provost Thompson.
Claims against Dean Austin under § 1981	Grevious: Austin’s negative evaluation was retaliatory	Defendants: Austin’s conduct predated protected complaints and he lacked decisive role in terminal contract	Court: affirmed dismissal—no evidence linking Austin’s evaluation to retaliation or decisive role in contract decision.

Key Cases Cited

Univ. of Texas Southwestern Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 2517 (2013) (Title VII retaliation requires but‑for causation for the plaintiff’s ultimate burden)
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973) (burden‑shifting framework for employment discrimination claims)
Moore v. City of Philadelphia, 461 F.3d 331 (3d Cir. 2006) (elements of retaliation prima facie case and pretext standard)
Woodson v. Scott Paper Co., 109 F.3d 913 (3d Cir. 1997) (discussing causation standards in retaliation cases)
Daniels v. Sch. Dist. of Philadelphia, 776 F.3d 181 (3d Cir. 2015) (summary judgment standard and McDonnell Douglas application)
Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604 (1993) (but‑for causation / determinative influence discussion)