Miller v. Deal
295 Ga. 504
Ga.2014Background
- Indigent parents sued Georgia officials (in effect DHS) after being jailed for civil contempt for unpaid child support without counsel; plaintiffs sought classwide declaratory and injunctive relief.
- Trial court certified a class of all unrepresented indigent parents threatened with incarceration in such proceedings; certification rested on OCGA § 9-11-23(a) and (b)(2).
- Court of Appeals reversed, reasoning plaintiffs had not shown commonality/typicality because many class members (including named plaintiffs) had not timely requested counsel or appealed, so individualized inquiries would be required.
- Georgia Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the Court of Appeals and affirmed, but on different reasoning: there is no categorical federal constitutional right to appointed counsel in these civil contempt child-support proceedings, so individualized entitlement inquiries defeat commonality and typicality.
- The Court clarified Turner v. Rogers controls: the Due Process Clause does not automatically require appointed counsel in such proceedings; any right is case-specific and depends on circumstances (complexity, presence of state counsel, alternative safeguards).
- Justice Benham concurred in part and dissented in part, arguing Georgia law (and state constitutional/state statutory considerations) may supply a broader, categorical right and that class certification was permissible; majority declined to resolve any independent Georgia‑constitutional claim because it was not adequately argued below.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether a categorical federal constitutional right to appointed counsel exists for indigent parents in civil contempt child‑support proceedings when DHS is represented by counsel | Plaintiffs: Due process requires appointed counsel for indigent parents jailed after civil contempt where DHS is represented; thus a categorical right exists (or at least when government is represented). | Defendants: No categorical federal right; Turner rejects automatic appointment; entitlement is fact‑specific. | No categorical federal right; entitlement is individualized; Turner controls. |
| Whether failure to request counsel (or to appeal) waives any right to appointed counsel | Plaintiffs: A right to counsel under due process is not waived by failure to request when the party was not informed or lacked counsel. | Defendants: Because many plaintiffs did not request counsel or appeal, there is no demonstrated deprivation. | Court: A due‑process right (if it exists) is not necessarily waived by an uninformed failure to request, but here entitlement is individualized so lack of uniform deprivation defeats class certification. |
| Whether class certification prerequisites (commonality, typicality, suitability of classwide relief) were met | Plaintiffs: Classwide relief appropriate because DHS’s routine practice leads to systemic denial of counsel and identical injury across class. | Defendants: Whether a particular member was entitled to counsel requires individualized fact‑specific inquiries; thus no common issues or typicality. | Court: Plaintiffs failed to show commonality, typicality, and propriety of classwide relief because entitlement to counsel depends on individualized considerations. |
| Whether plaintiffs preserved or adequately raised a Georgia‑constitutional claim that might provide broader protection than the U.S. Constitution | Plaintiffs: Alleged Georgia Constitution claims in complaint; state constitution may provide greater rights. | Defendants: Plaintiffs did not develop a reasoned Georgia‑constitutional argument below or on appeal. | Court: Declined to decide whether Georgia Constitution affords greater protection because plaintiffs failed to develop the argument; assumed state and federal due‑process standards coincide for this appeal. |
Key Cases Cited
- Turner v. Rogers, 131 S. Ct. 2507 (2011) (Due Process does not automatically require appointed counsel in civil contempt child‑support proceedings; entitlement is fact‑specific)
- Lassiter v. Department of Social Services of Durham County, 452 U.S. 18 (1981) (presumption that right to appointed counsel arises in proceedings that may lead to loss of physical liberty, but not categorical across all such proceedings)
- Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (1973) (no categorical right to counsel in probation/parole revocation; counsel may be required in particular cases and where timely request and colorable claims are made)
- In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967) (juvenile delinquency proceedings requiring counsel as they are functionally similar to criminal prosecutions)
- Wal‑Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011) (class certification may overlap with merits; commonality inquiry may require addressing substantive legal issues)
- Amgen Inc. v. Connecticut Retirement Plans & Trust Funds, 133 S. Ct. 1184 (2013) (merits questions may be considered to the extent relevant to class certification)
- Adkins v. Adkins, 242 Ga. 248 (1978) (Georgia case addressing Sixth Amendment in civil contempt context; did not resolve due‑process right to counsel in civil contempts)