Miller v. Colvin
122 F. Supp. 3d 23
W.D.N.Y.2015Background
- Plaintiff Harry J. Miller, Jr. applied for DIB and SSI alleging onset May 1, 2009 (amended), later amended onset dates and a date last insured of March 31, 2012; applications denied administratively and ALJ found not disabled.
- ALJ found severe impairments: bipolar disorder, impulse control disorder, mild mental retardation, GERD, and morbid obesity; RFC limited to non‑fast‑paced, simple, routine, repetitive work with limited interaction.
- Treating psychiatrist Venkata Satti, M.D., and psychiatric social worker Mirjana Dorozan completed a detailed Mental Assessment finding numerous areas “seriously limited” (e.g., following work rules, relating to coworkers, dealing with work stress, attention/concentration); examining psychologist Richard Hoyt, Ph.D., administered testing showing FSIQ ~57 and concluded Plaintiff could not function in competitive employment.
- ALJ gave partial weight to Dr. Satti/Dorozan and little weight to Dr. Hoyt; relied on Plaintiff’s limited activities of daily living and prior short stints of work to discount treating/examining opinions and concluded jobs existed Plaintiff could perform.
- District court found the ALJ failed to give "good reasons" for not affording controlling weight to the treating/examining opinions, that the ALJ improperly equated limited household activities and treatment attendance with workplace functional capacity, and that remand for benefits calculation (not further proceedings) was warranted.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether ALJ gave "good reasons" for declining to give controlling weight to treating psychiatrist’s opinion | ALJ failed to explain with sufficient specificity and mischaracterized daily activities to discount treating opinion | ALJ relied on Plaintiff’s activities, ability to oversee treatment, and past work history to justify discounting | Court: ALJ did not give legally sufficient "good reasons"; treating opinion should have been afforded deference |
| Whether ALJ properly weighed examining psychologist Dr. Hoyt's report | Hoyt’s testing and opinion corroborate treating opinion that Plaintiff cannot sustain competitive employment | ALJ discounted Hoyt because Plaintiff had prior earnings in years before onset | Court: ALJ’s reasons were selective and not a good reason to give little weight to Hoyt |
| Whether limited activities of daily living and treatment attendance justify rejection of severe limitations | Limited ADLs and treatment attendance do not demonstrate ability to work full‑time in a competitive setting | Commissioner relied on these activities to infer greater functional capacity | Court: Basic ADLs and attending appointments are not substantial evidence to reject serious workplace limitations |
| Remedy: remand for further proceedings vs. immediate payment of benefits | Given treating and examining opinions plus VE testimony that including those limitations eliminates all work, benefits should be awarded | Commissioner argued for affirmance / further proceedings | Court: Reversed and remanded for calculation and payment of benefits (further proceedings would serve no purpose) |
Key Cases Cited
- Green-Younger v. Barnhart, 335 F.3d 99 (2d Cir. 2003) (standard for district court review of Commissioner findings)
- Halloran v. Barnhart, 362 F.3d 28 (2d Cir. 2004) (treating physician rule and weight to treating opinions)
- Blakley v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 581 F.3d 399 (6th Cir. 2009) ("good reasons" requirement and need for specific explanation)
- Rogers v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 486 F.3d 234 (6th Cir. 2007) (importance of procedural protections in crediting medical opinions)
- Snell v. Apfel, 177 F.3d 128 (2d Cir. 1999) (failure to provide good reasons for discounting treating physician is ground for remand)
- Rosa v. Callahan, 168 F.3d 72 (2d Cir. 1999) (remand appropriate where ALJ applied improper legal standard)
- Parker v. Harris, 626 F.2d 225 (2d Cir. 1980) (reversal without further proceedings when record contains persuasive proof of disability)
- Butts v. Barnhart, 388 F.3d 377 (2d Cir. 2004) (when further proceedings would not produce additional evidence supporting non‑disability, benefits may be awarded)
- Balsamo v. Chater, 142 F.3d 75 (2d Cir. 1998) (claimant need not be an invalid to be found disabled)
- Novy v. Astrue, 497 F.3d 708 (7th Cir. 2007) (adaptive functioning and its role in intellectual disability assessments)