Miller v. City of Los Angeles
2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 21739
| 9th Cir. | 2011Background
- Philip Miller's family sued the City of Los Angeles and LAPD officials after Miller was killed by Sergeant Mata.
- The district court barred arguing Miller possessed a weapon; Arias argued Mata's perception of threat in closing and testified from Mata's perspective.
- Arias's closing statement claimed Miller shot Bean inside the Lodge, conflicting with the court's order and evidence.
- The first trial ended in a hung jury; sanctions were imposed by the district court for Arias's closing statement.
- The Millers appealed, challenging the sanctions as improper compensatory penalties and procedural defects; the City conceded a violation but contested bad faith.
- The Ninth Circuit reversed the sanctions, remanding to determine whether any sanction is warranted, and left open further proceedings.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Did Arias violate the in limine order? | Miller: Arias's closing violated the order. | City: any violation was inadvertent and not bad faith. | Violation established; conceded by City. |
| Was the violation committed in bad faith? | Arias acted deliberately to inflame the jury. | No bad faith; violation was inadvertent. | Bad faith supported by record; nonetheless sanctions reversed on other grounds. |
| Were the sanctions properly limited to compensatory damages caused by the violation? | Sanctions should reflect actual harm and fees due to the first trial. | Sanctions vindicate authority and deter future misconduct; may be non-compensatory. | Sanctions improperly awarded as compensatory without causation findings; reversed on remand for potential further consideration. |
| Did the district court err in applying inherent-power sanctions without proper procedures? | Procedural safeguards and criminal-process protections should apply for large sanctions. | Dual-purpose sanctions do not require criminal-process protections. | Procedural safeguards not strictly required; appellate court adopted deferential review, ultimately reversing sanctions. |
Key Cases Cited
- Primus Auto. Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Batarse, 115 F.3d 644 (9th Cir. 1997) (defer to district court findings in sanction determinations)
- Lasar v. Ford Motor Co., 399 F.3d 1101 (9th Cir. 2005) (tone and context of statements can violate orders even if literal words do not)
- Hinkson, 585 F.3d 1247 (9th Cir. 2009) (en banc; uphold district court findings unless illogical or implausible)
- Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32 (Supreme Court 1991) (dual-purpose sanctions; vindicate authority and compensate plaintiffs)
- B.K.B. v. Maui Police Dep't, 276 F.3d 1091 (9th Cir. 2002) (sanctions may be awarded for willful misconduct; beyond mere compensatory damages)
- In re Dyer, 322 F.3d 1178 (9th Cir. 2003) (causation required for compensatory sanctions; remand for actual damages)
- Fink v. Gomez, 239 F.3d 989 (9th Cir. 2001) (reckless misstatements sanctionable when combined with improper purpose)
- Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200 (1987) (jurors are presumed to follow instructions)