790 S.E.2d 484
Va.2016Background
- MRB bought the vacant Miller & Rhoads Building in 2006, located inside a City special service and assessment district and subject to both the citywide real estate tax and a special district tax calculated as a percentage of assessed value.
- MRB rehabilitated the property and applied for Richmond’s Partial Exemption for Rehabilitated Real Estate (Richmond City Code §§ 98-149 to -159) to recoup rehabilitation costs.
- The City applied the Partial Exemption to the base city real estate tax but refused to apply it to the special district tax; MRB paid the special district tax under protest and sued for correction/refund.
- The parties stipulated the sole dispute: whether the Partial Exemption also applies to the City’s special district tax (Richmond City Code §§ 98-816 and 98-842).
- The trial court held the Partial Exemption did not apply to the special district tax, reasoning the special district tax was not a “real estate tax” within the Partial Exemption’s meaning; the court entered a final order and MRB appealed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Richmond’s Partial Exemption for rehabilitated real estate applies to the City’s special district tax | MRB: the special district tax is a tax on real estate and therefore falls within the Partial Exemption’s plain text (applies to "real estate taxation") | City: special district tax is a different kind of real-estate-based charge and is not subject to the Partial Exemption; alternatively, §98-816 limits which Chapter 98 provisions apply to special district assessments | Court: affirmed trial court — Partial Exemption does not apply to the special district tax because §98-816 makes special district assessments subject only to enumerated levy/collection sections and omits the Partial Exemption (expressio unius) |
| Whether the trial court erred by relying on legislative purpose and origin rather than plain text | MRB: interpretation should follow plain statutory text — exemption applies to any real estate tax | City: purpose and practical differences support exclusion | Court: trial court erred in its purposive reasoning, but judgment stands under "right result for wrong reason" doctrine because the record supports the expressio unius statutory-ground adopted by the majority |
Key Cases Cited
- CVAS 2, LLC v. City of Fredericksburg, 289 Va. 100 (statutory interpretation reviewed de novo)
- Baker v. Commonwealth, 284 Va. 572 (use plain meaning unless ambiguous)
- Haynes v. Haggerty, 291 Va. 301 ("right result for wrong reason" principle)
- Perry v. Commonwealth, 280 Va. 572 (affirming judgment despite erroneous reasoning)
- Virginia Dep’t of Health v. NRV Real Estate, LLC, 278 Va. 181 (application of expressio unius canon)
- City of Richmond v. Richmond-Petersburg Turnpike Auth., 204 Va. 596 (determining whether a levy constitutes a real estate tax)
