Miller, D. v. Puccio, A., 897 WDA 2015

Background

In 2013 Miller contracted to buy the Puccios' house; Coldwell Banker agent Sala handled listing and communications. Closing was scheduled May 31, 2013 but fell through after a disputed one-week extension and a termination notice; Miller’s deposit was returned.
Miller sued the Puccios, Angeline Puccio, Coldwell Banker, and Sala alleging fraud, negligent/intentional misrepresentation, unfair trade practices, and later breach of contract; the court dismissed the first four counts against all defendants, leaving only breach of contract against the Puccios.
The Puccios answered and arbitration favored them; Miller appealed but then settled with the Puccios by consent order on September 11, 2014, which stated the Puccios retained the right to bring a cross-claim against Coldwell Banker and Sala or assign that right to Miller.
Coldwell Banker and Sala had been dismissed earlier (December 10, 2013) and were not parties to the settlement negotiations or the consent order.
On April 6, 2015 Miller, via an asserted assignment from the Puccios, filed a ‘‘cross-claim’’ against Coldwell Appellees at the same docket without serving them or complying with joinder rules; Coldwell Appellees moved to strike and the special motions court granted the motion on June 1, 2015.
Miller appealed; the Superior Court affirmed, holding the April 2015 filing was procedurally improper (not a cross-claim, untimely joinder, no service) and the consent order did not override pleading and joinder rules or revive claims against parties already dismissed.

Issues

Issue	Miller's Argument	Coldwell Appellees' Argument	Held
Whether Miller could file a "cross-claim" (via assignment) against Coldwell Appellees after they had been dismissed	The consent order preserved or assigned the Puccios’ right to file a cross-claim and the motions court should give effect to that agreement	Coldwell Appellees had been dismissed earlier; a cross-claim must be in an answer and could not be filed after dismissal without court leave or joinder procedure	Held: Filing was improper — Coldwell Appellees were no longer parties, so a cross-claim could not be asserted and the consent order did not revive dismissed parties’ status
Whether the April 2015 filing complied with rules for asserting cross-claims or joining additional defendants	The court could construe the filing as a third-party complaint or late joinder and should permit it, particularly given no prejudice to Coldwell Appellees	The filing was not in the Puccios’ answer (Rule 1031.1), no amended answer/leave was sought, and joinder rules (2251–2255) were not followed	Held: The filing failed procedural requirements for cross-claims and joinder; leave or written consent was required and was not obtained
Whether service and commencement rules were satisfied for joining Coldwell Appellees after dismissal	Miller claimed Coldwell Appellees had notice of the consent order and were not prejudiced	Coldwell Appellees had not been served as required for joinder and formal service is mandatory to confer jurisdiction	Held: No proper service or commencement occurred; service rules must be strictly followed and were not met
Whether the consent order created a legal bar to striking the filing under law-of-the-case or other principles	Miller argued the consent order and assignment created a presumption of "just cause" for late joinder and bound the court to allow pursuit of assigned claims	The consent order is a settlement reflecting the parties’ agreement, not a legal determination reviving dismissed parties or excusing procedural requirements	Held: Consent order did not override pleadings/joinder rules and did not invoke law-of-the-case; settlement cannot revive dismissed parties without compliance with procedure

Key Cases Cited

Francisco v. Ford Motor Co., 580 A.2d 374 (Pa. Super. 1990) (standard of review for motion to strike)
Peters Creek Sanitary Auth. v. Welch, 681 A.2d 167 (Pa. 1996) (burden and standards for late pleadings and prejudice analysis)
Edmonds v. MBB, Inc., 559 A.2d 590 (Pa. Super. 1989) (cross-claims added after initial answer require consent or leave)
Mayer v. Garman, 912 A.2d 762 (Pa. 2006) (joinder procedure and protections for plaintiffs against belated joinder)
Cintas Corp. v. Lee's Cleaning Servs., Inc., 700 A.2d 915 (Pa. 1997) (service of process is prerequisite to court jurisdiction and must be strictly followed)
Kovalesky v. Esther Williams Swimming Pools, 497 A.2d 661 (Pa. Super. 1985) (burden on party to justify delay in joining additional defendant)
Lawrence v. Meeker, 717 A.2d 1046 (Pa. Super. 1998) (requirements for belated joinder: grounds, excuse, and lack of prejudice)
Commercial Banking Corp. v. Culp, 443 A.2d 1154 (Pa. Super. 1982) (petition for leave to join beyond deadline must allege reasonable justification)
Step Plan Servs., Inc. v. Koresko, 12 A.3d 401 (Pa. Super. 2010) (settlement will be set aside only for fraud, duress, or mutual mistake)