Milledge v. State, 811 S.E.2d 796

Background

Deputies stopped Michael Milledge for a traffic defect in a high-crime area; Milledge exhibited extreme nervousness (shaking hands, unable to dial his phone) and avoided eye contact.
Deputies asked Milledge to exit the vehicle; an officer asked if he had weapons in provocative language, received no response, and performed a pat-down frisk for officer safety.
Officer felt a revolver in Milledge’s pocket; when removing it, deputies also recovered a baggie with crack, ecstasy, and pills; Milledge was indicted and convicted on multiple drug- and weapon-related charges.
Defense moved in limine to suppress the drugs as fruit of an unlawful frisk; the trial court denied suppression, finding reasonable, articulable suspicion based on the totality of circumstances. Defense counsel failed to contemporaneously object when the evidence was admitted at trial.
On PCR, Milledge argued counsel was ineffective for failing to renew the objection at trial; the PCR court granted relief, finding counsel deficient and that Milledge was prejudiced because the frisk lacked reasonable suspicion.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed the PCR court, holding there was evidence to support the trial court's finding of reasonable suspicion and therefore Milledge failed to show prejudice under Strickland.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether defense counsel's failure to contemporaneously object to admission of contraband at trial constituted ineffective assistance (prejudice prong)	Milledge: counsel's failure to renew the suppression objection prejudiced him because the frisk was unlawful and evidence would have been suppressed on appeal, likely changing the outcome	State: Even if counsel erred, no prejudice because the frisk was supported by reasonable, articulable suspicion and an appellate court would have affirmed	Court held no prejudice: record supports trial court's finding of reasonable suspicion for protective frisk, so an objection would not have changed the outcome
Whether the deputies' frisk violated the Fourth Amendment (reasonable suspicion)	Milledge: factors relied on (nervousness, presence in high-crime area) were insufficient under Tindall and Moore to justify a frisk	State: Totality of the circumstances (extreme nervousness, evasive behavior, attempts to use phone, officers’ experience, high-crime area) justified a Terry frisk for officer safety	Court held frisk lawful: when viewed in aggregate and given officers' training/experience, reasonable suspicion existed to justify frisk
Proper standard for reviewing prejudice in PCR where suppression issue was decided pretrial but not preserved at trial	Milledge: PCR court may independently evaluate whether evidence would have been suppressed and whether that would change outcome	State: Focus should be whether appellate court would have affirmed trial court's pretrial ruling; PCR must show reasonable probability of a different result on appeal	Court held: PCR must assess whether there is record evidence to support trial court's ruling; here such evidence existed, so no prejudice
Distinguishing Tindall (prolonged detention/search) from this case	Milledge relied on Tindall to show frisk/search unreasonable	State: Tindall concerned extended detention and vehicle search after purpose of stop concluded; not analogous	Court held Tindall inapplicable: frisk here was limited, contemporaneous with stop, and for officer safety

Key Cases Cited

Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (supports validity of traffic stops based on probable cause)
Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106 (permits ordering driver out of vehicle for officer safety during traffic stop)
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (establishes frisk for officer safety based on reasonable, articulable suspicion)
United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1 (totality-of-the-circumstances test for reasonable suspicion)
United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411 (officer may draw inferences from training and experience)
Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119 (presence in high-crime area is a relevant consideration for reasonable suspicion)
State v. Smith, 329 S.C. 550 (Ct. App.) (upholding protective frisk under similar facts)
State v. Tindall, 388 S.C. 518 (distinguishes prolonged detention/search from limited frisk)
State v. Moore, 415 S.C. 245 (clarifies nervousness may support reasonable suspicion when viewed in aggregate)
State v. Brown, 401 S.C. 82 (appellate review of suppression rulings: affirm if any evidence supports trial court)
State v. Khingratsaiphon, 352 S.C. 62 (standard of review for motions to suppress)