Mikhaylov v. United States
29 F. Supp. 3d 260
E.D.N.Y2014Background
- On Aug. 31, 2011 DEA agents entered Daniel Mikhaylov’s hotel room in Los Angeles, seized $195,600 in cash, and detained him without a warrant; agents told him he would receive paperwork and could file a claim.
- The DEA mailed a certified written notice of seizure (Sept. 19, 2011) to Mikhaylov’s former New York apartment (return receipt signed Sept. 21); the DEA also published notices in The Wall Street Journal on Oct. 3, 10, and 17, 2011.
- Deadlines set by the notices (Oct. 24 or Nov. 17, 2011 depending on receipt) passed with no timely filed claim; the DEA issued a declaration of administrative forfeiture on Dec. 8, 2011.
- Mikhaylov did not actually receive the mailed notice until Jan. 2, 2012 (he had moved from the Rego Park address before the seizure); he filed a petition for remission on Jan. 16, 2012 which the DEA refused to treat as a claim and denied as untimely.
- Mikhaylov brought an action construed as an 18 U.S.C. § 983(e) motion to set aside the administrative forfeiture and asserted Bivens claims (challenging the forfeiture and his arrest/confinement). Defendants moved to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction and improper venue.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether DEA failed to take reasonable steps to provide constitutionally adequate notice under 18 U.S.C. § 983(e)(1)(A) | DEA mailed notice to wrong (old) address; Mikhaylov did not receive notice in time to file a claim | DEA mailed certified notice to known address (with signed return receipt) and published notices; those steps were reasonable under Mullane/Dusenbery | Court: DEA took reasonable steps; notice was adequate, § 983(e)(1)(A) not met |
| Whether Mikhaylov lacked knowledge of the seizure such that § 983(e)(1)(B) is satisfied | He argues he did not know the DEA specifically intended to forfeit or conduct administrative forfeiture; actual mailed notice not received timely | Mikhaylov was present at the seizure and was told DEA agents were involved and that he could file a claim | Court: Mikhaylov knew of the seizure and DEA's involvement; § 983(e)(1)(B) not met |
| Whether Bivens claims may be used to attack an administrative forfeiture after CAFRA | Bivens may remedy constitutional violations arising from seizure and forfeiture | CAFRA makes § 983(e) the exclusive remedy to set aside an administrative declaration of forfeiture | Court: § 983(e) is exclusive; forfeiture-related Bivens claims dismissed for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction |
| Venue and jurisdiction over Bivens claims for arrest/confinement | Eastern District proper (plaintiff filed there) | Claims against U.S., DEA, and agents in official capacities barred; personal-capacity claims against individual agents arose in Central District of California | Court: Bivens suits cannot be against U.S. or federal agency/official-capacity defendants (dismissed); remaining personal-capacity claims venue improper here and case transferred to Central District of California |
Key Cases Cited
- Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950) (established constitutional standard for reasonableness of notice)
- Dusenbery v. United States, 534 U.S. 161 (2002) (applied Mullane to forfeiture contexts; actual notice not required where steps are reasonably calculated)
- Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14 (1980) (where Congress provides an alternative remedial scheme explicitly intended as substitute, Bivens relief is displaced)
- FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471 (1994) (Bivens does not permit suits against the United States or federal agencies; individual-capacity suits only)
- Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16 (1983) (statutory interpretation principle: different wording in same Act implies different meanings)
- United States v. 414 Kings Highway, 128 F.3d 125 (2d Cir. 1997) (judicial decree of forfeiture vests title in government)