Mike Yoder v. Scott Bowen, 146 F.4th 516

Plaintiffs (Mike Yoder, Drone Deer Recovery, LLC, and Jeremy Funke) challenged a Michigan law banning the use of drones to hunt or locate downed game animals.
Drone Deer Recovery provides services using thermal drones to help hunters find animals they've shot but can't locate. The company wanted to expand operations to Michigan.
Michigan's Drone Statute prohibits using unmanned aerial vehicles to "take" game, which is defined broadly to include both hunting and recovering downed animals.
Plaintiffs argued the law prevented them from operating in Michigan, limiting their ability to create and share location information about downed game — activity they described as protected First Amendment speech.
The district court dismissed the complaint, holding that plaintiffs lacked standing and failed to state a claim for which relief could be granted.
On appeal, the Sixth Circuit found plaintiffs had standing but ultimately held the complaint did not sufficiently assert a First Amendment violation, and affirmed dismissal.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Standing	Plaintiffs face imminent injury: threatened enforcement chills lawful, constitutionally protected conduct; drone-based recovery is speech.	No credible threat of enforcement; plaintiffs haven't shown warning letters or prior prosecutions; no standing.	Plaintiffs have standing: alleged sufficient threat of enforcement and chill to proceed.
Application of First Amendment	Drone use to create/disseminate location info is protected speech; the statute bans this expressive activity.	The law restricts only conduct (use of drones), not speech; creating GPS pins or sharing info is not banned.	Creating location info via drones is not inherently expressive conduct or political speech; statute does not target speech.
Scrutiny Level	Law is content-based, targets location info, imposes on expressive conduct; strict scrutiny applies.	Statute is content-neutral, regulates conduct unrelated to message or idea; intermediate scrutiny applies.	Intermediate scrutiny applies: the statute is content-neutral, regulates conduct, not expression.
Merits Under Appropriate Scrutiny	The ban is more restrictive than necessary; less intrusive means could serve state’s interests.	Statute advances significant state interests: protecting natural resources, fair-chase principles; law is properly tailored.	Statute survives intermediate scrutiny: substantial state interests, no greater than necessary restriction.

Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552 (2011) (creation and dissemination of information can be speech under the First Amendment)
Meyer v. Grant, 486 U.S. 414 (1988) (restriction on a means of expression does not remove First Amendment protection)
Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622 (1994) (content-neutral regulations assessed under intermediate scrutiny)
United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968) (explaining intermediate scrutiny for incidental burdens on speech in conduct regulations)
Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989) (defining inherently expressive conduct for First Amendment purposes)
Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 576 U.S. 155 (2015) (distinguishing content-based and content-neutral laws under the First Amendment)