Michelle Iapichino v. Hackensack University Medical, 20-2980

Background

Plaintiff Michelle Iapichino, a former HUMC registered nurse and supervisor, was terminated after supervisors reported on‑duty impairment and Occupational Medicine recorded a positive drug test for illegal and non‑prescribed substances.
Iapichino sued in state court asserting NJLAD failure to accommodate and disability discrimination claims and FMLA retaliation and interference claims; defendants removed to federal court.
The District Court denied Iapichino’s motion for partial summary judgment (FMLA interference) and granted defendants’ motion for summary judgment on all claims, finding HUMC articulated a legitimate, non‑discriminatory reason (positive drug test) and Iapichino failed to show pretext.
The Disciplinary Action Notice cited Occupational Medicine findings as the basis for termination; supervisors’ testimony that they did not recall observing impairment did not negate the positive test evidence.
HUMC’s drug policy required self‑disclosure before being asked to submit to reasonable‑suspicion testing; Iapichino did not self‑disclose and offered no comparable examples of different treatment.
On FMLA, Iapichino’s initial leave was through Dec. 13, 2015; HUMC made the termination decision Dec. 3 but did not effect termination until Dec. 15, and the court held HUMC did not interfere with FMLA rights given the information available and applicable regulations allowing termination for substance abuse.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether HUMC’s stated reason for termination (on‑duty impairment/positive drug test) was a pretext for discrimination/retaliation under NJLAD/McDonnell Douglas	Iapichino: supervisors’ failure to recall seeing impairment and alleged inconsistent application of the drug policy show pretext	HUMC: termination was based on Occupational Medicine’s positive drug test and was a legitimate, non‑discriminatory reason; policy applied consistently	Held for defendants: plaintiff offered no evidence from which a jury could find the proffered reason unworthy of credence; summary judgment affirmed
Whether HUMC applied its drug‑use policy discriminatorily (unequal application or improper denial of self‑disclosure safe harbor)	Iapichino: policy was applied inconsistently and she should have been afforded safe harbor	HUMC: policy required self‑disclosure before testing; Iapichino did not self‑disclose and provided no comparators	Held for defendants: no evidence of disparate application or comparators; policy applied properly
Whether HUMC interfered with Iapichino’s FMLA rights by terminating her employment	Iapichino: termination interfered with requested FMLA leave and protections	HUMC: even if FMLA applied, termination was for substance‑abuse policy violation unrelated to FMLA; termination occurred after her initial requested leave period	Held for defendants: no interference—employer allowed job protection through the requested period and termination was permissible for substance abuse

Key Cases Cited

McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973) (establishes burden‑shifting framework for discrimination claims)
Capps v. Mondelez Global, LLC, 847 F.3d 144 (3d Cir. 2017) (applies McDonnell Douglas framework in employment discrimination contexts)
Victor v. State, 4 A.3d 126 (N.J. 2010) (New Jersey authority on burden‑shifting and discrimination proof)
Lichtenstein v. Univ. of Pittsburgh Med. Ctr., 691 F.3d 294 (3d Cir. 2012) (FMLA interference; employer may take action for substance abuse without violating FMLA)
Sommer v. The Vanguard Grp., 461 F.3d 397 (3d Cir. 2006) (FMLA interference does not require proof of discriminatory intent)
Callison v. City of Philadelphia, 430 F.3d 117 (3d Cir. 2005) (clarifies standards for proving FMLA interference)
Sarnowski v. Air Brooke Limousine, Inc., 510 F.3d 398 (3d Cir. 2007) (FMLA does not protect employees from termination for reasons other than interference with FMLA rights)
Giles v. Kearney, 571 F.3d 318 (3d Cir. 2009) (plenary review standard for summary judgment)