Michael White v. Charles Ryan
895 F.3d 641
9th Cir.2018Background
- Michael White was convicted of first-degree murder for killing David Johnson; the trial court found one statutory aggravator—pecuniary gain (life insurance)—and sentenced White to death.
- After direct appeal and a post-conviction relief (PCR) grant limited to penalty-phase, White was resentenced to death; at resentencing new counsel (McVay) failed to challenge the pecuniary-gain aggravator and presented almost no mitigation.
- McVay did not meaningfully investigate White’s background: readily available school, medical (including Graves’ disease/hyperthyroidism), ADOC psychiatric records, family history, head injury, low childhood IQ, substance history, and evidence of manipulation by co-defendant Susan Johnson.
- The state PCR court denied relief, concluding counsel’s choices were strategic and that any omitted mitigation would not have changed the sentence; the Arizona Supreme Court affirmed.
- The federal district court denied White’s habeas petition; the Ninth Circuit reversed, holding counsel’s failures were both deficient under Strickland and prejudicial, and ordered a conditional writ (new sentencing or lesser sentence).
Issues
| Issue | White's Argument | State's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether resentencing counsel performed deficiently by failing to challenge the pecuniary-gain aggravator | McVay failed to challenge the sole aggravator due to a mistaken belief the issue was settled on direct appeal, not a strategic choice; this was deficient performance | The aggravator was properly found and counsel’s omission was reasonable or strategic | Counsel’s omission was not strategic but based on legal mistake; performance was deficient |
| Whether counsel performed deficiently by failing to investigate and present mitigation (medical, psychiatric, intellectual, social history) | Counsel ignored readily available records and failed to hire experts or mitigate despite clear indicators of mental illness, Graves’ disease, low IQ, abuse history, and co-defendant manipulation | The PCR court found no duty to obtain records absent stronger suggestion of mitigating value and concluded lack of prejudice | Counsel’s failure to investigate was objectively unreasonable under prevailing norms and AEDPA review; deficient performance established |
| Whether White was prejudiced by counsel’s failures (Strickland prejudice prong) | Cumulative omitted mitigation (mental illness, Graves’, low IQ, abuse/neglect, co-defendant’s role) would likely have altered sentencing balance given only one weak aggravator | State argued omitted items individually insufficient and PCR court had considered similar evidence at resentencing | The Ninth Circuit held prejudice shown: reasonable probability of different sentence given weak aggravation and substantial unpresented mitigation; PCR court applied wrong prejudice analysis |
| Whether the state court unreasonably applied federal precedent (AEDPA deference) | State court’s findings were contrary to and unreasonable applications of Strickland, Wiggins, and related Supreme Court precedent | State relied on PCR factual findings and cited Coleman; urged deference under AEDPA | Ninth Circuit: the PCR court unreasonably applied controlling Supreme Court precedent; federal relief warranted (conditional writ) |
Key Cases Cited
- Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (establishes two-prong ineffective-assistance test: deficient performance and prejudice)
- Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510 (2003) (counsel’s duty to conduct a thorough mitigation investigation; evaluate cumulative mitigation)
- Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374 (2005) (ABA mitigation guidelines are guides to reasonableness; counsel’s failure to examine readily available records can be deficient)
- Porter v. McCollum, 558 U.S. 30 (2009) (deficient investigation and unpresented mitigation can establish prejudice)
- Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000) (counsel obligations and relevance of mitigating evidence; cumulative-review requirement)
- Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86 (2011) (limits on post hoc rationalization of counsel’s strategy and AEDPA deference principles)
- Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170 (2011) (AEDPA standard for federal habeas review of state-court adjudications)
- Crace v. Herzog, 798 F.3d 840 (9th Cir. 2015) (federal review when state court misapplies Strickland)
- Coleman v. Calderon, 150 F.3d 1105 (9th Cir. 1998) (discussed by PCR court but distinguished by Ninth Circuit on facts)
