983 F.3d 1206
11th Cir.2020Background
- Michael Roy Smith, a Jamaican lawful permanent resident, was convicted by a Florida jury in 2006 of three counts of vehicular homicide after a single accident that killed three people; he was acquitted of DUI-manslaughter counts.
- The Department of Homeland Security charged Smith with removability under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii) for having been convicted of two or more crimes involving moral turpitude (CIMTs), citing the vehicular-homicide convictions and an earlier aggravated-assault conviction (1988).
- The IJ found Smith removable; the BIA affirmed, concluding Florida vehicular homicide is a CIMT because it requires reckless conduct.
- The Eleventh Circuit reviewed de novo whether Smith’s conviction qualifies as a CIMT, applying the categorical approach and following Florida Supreme Court precedent on the statute’s mens rea.
- The Florida Supreme Court in McCreary and Florida appellate decisions interpret Fla. Stat. § 782.071 to require recklessness—more than ordinary negligence and tied to willful or wanton disregard likely to cause death or great bodily harm.
- The Eleventh Circuit held that vehicular homicide under Florida law is categorically a CIMT and denied Smith’s petition for review.
Issues
| Issue | Smith's Argument | Government/BIA's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Florida vehicular homicide (Fla. Stat. § 782.071) is a crime involving moral turpitude | Statute and jury instructions do not require the culpable mental state (willful/wanton or conscious disregard) necessary for a CIMT | The statute and Florida Supreme Court precedents require recklessness (willful/wanton or conscious disregard likely to cause death or great bodily harm), which qualifies as moral turpitude | Vehicular homicide is categorically a CIMT; petition denied |
| Whether reliance on Florida standard jury instructions undermines the mens rea requirement | Standard jury instructions used at trial do not explicitly require willful/wanton conduct, so conviction could rest on mere negligence | Florida Supreme Court interpretation and the statutory text control; standard instructions do not override the statute and are not binding precedent | Court rejects Smith’s instruction-based argument and follows Florida Supreme Court’s recklessness requirement |
Key Cases Cited
- Keungne v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 561 F.3d 1281 (2009) (defines moral turpitude to include criminal recklessness and explains when reckless conduct qualifies)
- Gelin v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 837 F.3d 1236 (2016) (applies categorical approach and reviews CIMT issues de novo)
- Fajardo v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 659 F.3d 1303 (2011) (explains categorical and modified categorical approaches)
- Molinos Valle Del Cibao, C. por A. v. Lama, 633 F.3d 1330 (2011) (directs federal courts to follow state supreme court interpretations of state statutes)
- McCreary v. State, 371 So. 2d 1024 (Fla. 1979) (Florida Supreme Court: vehicular homicide requires recklessness—more than ordinary negligence)
- Luzardo v. State, 147 So. 3d 1083 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2014) (interprets reckless driving as willful or wanton disregard and ties it to vehicular homicide)
- Somer v. Johnson, 704 F.2d 1473 (11th Cir. 1983) (standard jury instructions approved for use are not necessarily authoritative statements of state law)
- Cano v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 709 F.3d 1052 (2013) (description of morally turpitudinous conduct cited by the BIA)