Michael Quinn Sullivan v. Salem Abraham
07-17-00125-CV
| Tex. | Jul 14, 2017Background
- Abraham (plaintiff) sued Sullivan (defendant) for defamation based on publication about a political rally; Sullivan moved to dismiss under the Texas Citizens Participation Act (TCPA).
- The district court dismissed Abraham’s claim but initially awarded Sullivan only modest attorney’s fees and denied sanctions; appellate and supreme-court review followed addressing whether justice and equity inform fee awards and the mandatory nature of sanctions/fees under the TCPA.
- The Texas Supreme Court held the TCPA requires an award of reasonable attorney’s fees (a fee that is moderate/fair) and remanded for determination of costs, reasonable fees, other expenses as justice and equity require, and a sanction.
- On remand the district court awarded Sullivan $35,000 for pre-remand fees, $7,200 for post-remand fees, $1,621.60 in costs, $17,240.03 in other expenses, and a $15,000 sanction; Sullivan challenged the amounts and the trial court’s findings.
- Sullivan’s appellate brief argues the trial court abused its discretion by (1) failing to apply Arthur Andersen factors and Supreme Court guidance, (2) sustaining improper evidentiary objections so findings lack evidentiary support, (3) issuing broad-form findings that commingle legally insufficient elements, and (4) denying conditional appellate fees.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Abraham) | Defendant's Argument (Sullivan) | Held (trial-court action) |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the district court abused its discretion by awarding an unreasonably low "reasonable" fee | Trial court acted within discretion (invoked justice/equity previously; objections sustained) | Award is excessive discount from proved lodestar; trial court failed to apply Arthur Andersen factors and Supreme Court guidance | Trial court awarded $35,000 pre-remand (Sullivan seeks reversal as abuse of discretion) |
| Whether there is legally sufficient evidence to support $35,000 pre-remand fee finding | Fees/expert testimony were objectionable and unreliable | Detailed time entries, expert testimony on rates/hours, and comparable local rates provided; no specific objections to entries | Court sustained plaintiff’s global objections and found $35,000 reasonable |
| Whether there is legally sufficient evidence to support $7,200 post-remand fee finding | Post-remand time/fees challenged as unnecessary or duplicative | Post-remand time entries were unchallenged and documented; lodestar supports higher figure | Court sustained objections and awarded $7,200 |
| Whether Findings of Fact 8 and 9 improperly commingle legally insufficient elements (Casteel line) | Trial court’s broad findings and accompanying conclusory elements are adequate | Findings are conclusory and prevent meaningful appellate review; commingling invalid elements requires reversal | Court entered broad-form findings referencing conclusory elements and did not specify how award was apportioned |
| Whether conditional appellate attorney’s fees must be awarded | Appellee contends appellate fees are not recoverable or are discretionary | When statutory award of fees is mandatory, conditional appellate fees supported by evidence are also mandatory to effectuate statute’s deterrent purpose | Trial court denied conditional appellate fee award; Sullivan seeks mandatory award on appeal |
Key Cases Cited
- Sullivan v. Abraham, 488 S.W.3d 294 (Tex. 2016) (Texas Supreme Court: TCPA requires award of reasonable attorney’s fees; reasonable means moderate/fair; remanded for fees, costs, other expenses, and sanction)
- Arthur Andersen & Co. v. Perry Equip. Corp., 945 S.W.2d 812 (Tex. 1997) (sets factors to determine reasonable attorney’s fees)
- Crown Life Ins. Co. v. Casteel, 22 S.W.3d 378 (Tex. 2000) (broad-form findings that commingle invalid theories/elements are harmful and require reversal)
- City of Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802 (Tex. 2005) (legal-sufficiency review standard for fact findings)
- Ventling v. Johnson, 466 S.W.3d 143 (Tex. 2015) (when trial court fee award is statutory/mandatory, appellate fees may also be awarded)
- Long v. Griffin, 442 S.W.3d 253 (Tex. 2014) (lodestar method evidence requirements: services performed, who performed them, rates, when, and hours)
- Zaidi v. Shah, 502 S.W.3d 434 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2016) (applies Casteel reasoning to bench-trial findings; reversible where damages finding aggregates legally insufficient elements)