934 F.3d 1101
9th Cir.2019Background
- Dr. Michael Murray sued Mayo Clinic and several individual defendants alleging disability discrimination under Title I of the ADA after his termination.
- The parties disputed the proper causation standard for ADA discrimination: Murray asked for a motivating-factor (mixed-motive) instruction; the defendants and the district court applied a but-for causation instruction.
- The district court instructed the jury that Murray must prove he was discharged because of his disability (but-for causation); the jury returned a verdict for defendants.
- Murray appealed, arguing this court’s prior precedent in Head v. Glacier Northwest required a motivating-factor standard for ADA discrimination claims.
- The Ninth Circuit panel considered whether intervening Supreme Court decisions (Gross and Nassar) undermined Head and whether Head remained controlling.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Proper causation standard for Title I ADA discrimination claims | Head controls: motivating-factor (disability need only be a motivating factor) | But-for causation is required in light of Supreme Court precedent | But-for causation applies; Head overruled to the extent it required motivating-factor causation |
| Whether Head remains binding Ninth Circuit precedent | Head remains controlling Ninth Circuit law | Head is undermined by Gross and Nassar and thus not controlling | Head is clearly irreconcilable with Gross and Nassar and is overruled |
| Applicability of Title VII §2000e-2(m)/§2000e-5 mixed-motive framework to ADA claims | ADA’s cross-reference to Title VII remedies supports applying §2000e-2(m) mixed-motive framework | §2000e-2(m) expressly covers only certain status-based categories and does not extend to disability; Supreme Court decisions reject importing mixed-motive rules across statutes | §2000e-2(m) does not make mixed-motive available for ADA Title I discrimination claims; ADA requires but-for causation |
| Effect of Supreme Court decisions Gross and Nassar on ADA causation law | Gross and Nassar do not control or do not require overturning Head | Gross and Nassar undercut Head’s textual and reasoning basis and are controlling | Gross and Nassar undercut Head; Supreme Court precedent dictates but-for causation for ADA discrimination claims |
Key Cases Cited
- Head v. Glacier Northwest, Inc., 413 F.3d 1053 (9th Cir. 2005) (held ADA discrimination claims were governed by a motivating-factor standard)
- Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167 (2009) (ADEA requires but-for causation; caution against importing Title VII rules into other statutes)
- Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 570 U.S. 338 (2013) (declined to apply motivating-factor standard to Title VII retaliation claims; emphasized textual limits)
- Miller v. Gammie, 335 F.3d 889 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc) (panel may overrule circuit precedent if intervening Supreme Court decision clearly irreconcilable)
- Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989) (plurality recognizing motivating-factor framework in Title VII gender discrimination context)
- Natofsky v. City of New York, 921 F.3d 337 (2d Cir. 2019) (applied Gross and Nassar to require but-for causation for ADA discrimination)
- Lewis v. Humboldt Acquisition Corp., 681 F.3d 312 (6th Cir. 2012) (en banc) (held Gross controls and ADA discrimination requires but-for causation)