Michael LaCurtis v. Express Medical Transporters
856 F.3d 571
| 8th Cir. | 2017Background
- EMT (Express Medical Transporters) operates paralift vans converted from Ford E-250/E-350 models; vans originally built for 12–15 passengers were modified by a third party to install up to two wheelchair positions and remove seats, yielding placarded capacities under eight for some vans.
- LaCurtis, an EMT paralift-van driver, sued for unpaid overtime under the FLSA and Missouri law, arguing he was a “covered employee” under the SAFETEA-LU Technical Corrections Act (TCA) small-vehicle exception because the vans he drove were not "designed or used to transport more than 8 passengers."
- EMT claimed the Motor Carrier Act (MCA) exemption to FLSA overtime applied because the vans were originally designed to carry more than eight passengers; EMT also invoked NHTSA regulation 49 C.F.R. § 571.3(b)(1) and a DOL compliance exam as defenses.
- The district court gave "some deference" to DOL Field Assistance Bulletin 2010-2 (FAB 2010-2), treated wheelchair placements as one passenger each, concluded the converted vans had fewer than eight seats, denied EMT summary judgment, and granted partial summary judgment for LaCurtis on liability.
- The district court certified two interlocutory questions under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b); the Eighth Circuit reviewed whether NHTSA § 571.3(b)(1) warrants controlling deference and whether vans originally built for 12–15 passengers but later converted to carry up to two wheelchairs and up to six ambulatory passengers are "designed or used to transport more than 8 passengers."
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (LaCurtis) | Defendant's Argument (EMT) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether NHTSA § 571.3(b)(1) is entitled to Chevron-level controlling deference in interpreting TCA § 306 | FAB 2010-2 and WHD enforcement practice should guide interpretation; NHTSA reg. not controlling | § 571.3(b)(1) defines seating equivalencies and should control the passenger-count question | Not entitled to controlling deference; NHTSA rule by a different DOT agency (NHTSA) lacks delegated authority to interpret TCA/MCA for this purpose |
| Whether "designed" in TCA § 306(c) means original manufacturer design or current/modified design | "Designed" should be read as current design after conversion; count current placarded capacity (plus wheelchairs) | "Designed" means original design at manufacture; later conversion is mere "use" | Ambiguous term; court adopts interpretation that includes substantial redesigns — current design after conversion controls; these vans are not "designed or used to transport more than 8 passengers" |
| How to count wheelchair placements for passenger capacity under TCA § 306(c) | Count each wheelchair placement as one passenger (per FAB 2010-2) | Wheelchair placements should count as more (NHTSA rule suggests four seating positions) | No statutory basis to count a wheelchair placement as four passengers; count as one for TCA § 306(c) purposes |
| Whether EMT may invoke a good-faith reliance defense based on DOL compliance exam (raised on appeal) | N/A (issue not certified for interlocutory appeal) | EMT contends it relied in good faith on prior DOL exam | Not considered on interlocutory appeal (issue uncertified); district court had rejected good-faith defense below |
Key Cases Cited
- Williams v. Cent. Transp. Int’l, Inc., 830 F.3d 773 (8th Cir.) (discussing MCA exemption and agency authority)
- Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984) (framework for deference to agency statutory interpretations)
- United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218 (2001) (limits on Chevron deference; when agency action carries force of law)
- Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337 (1997) (statutory interpretation principles; plainness and context)
- Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944) (persuasive weight of agency interpretations)