Michael Killion v. John Coffey, 696 F. App'x 76

Five Pennsauken police officers and FOP members sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (and a parallel NJCRA claim) alleging retaliation for publicly supporting implementation of twelve-hour shifts.
They claimed retaliation violated their First Amendment free speech and freedom of association rights.
The District Court dismissed the Second Amended Complaint with prejudice; the officers appealed.
The Third Circuit reviewed the dismissal de novo and applied Garcetti’s public-employee speech framework to both the speech and associational-retaliation claims.
The court concluded the officers spoke as employees (not private citizens) because their advocacy relied on special knowledge and experience acquired through their police employment, so Garcetti foreclosed their § 1983 claims.
The Third Circuit affirmed dismissal with prejudice; it did not reach qualified immunity and rejected the argument that union activity is per se protected from Garcetti analysis.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether officers’ advocacy for twelve-hour shifts is protected citizen speech under Garcetti	Officers: they spoke as citizens addressing public matters and had an obligation to speak for the public and their union	Municipality: advocacy arose from job-specific knowledge and duties, so speech was part of official duties	Held: Speech was part of official duties — not protected as citizen speech under Garcetti
Whether freedom-of-association retaliation claim requires Garcetti/public-concern analysis	Officers: union activity is per se protected; Garcetti should not apply	Municipality: associational claim is coextensive with speech claim and subject to Garcetti	Held: Associational claim is treated like the speech claim and subjected to Garcetti analysis
Whether officers showed retaliatory adverse action sufficient to deter ordinary firmness	Officers: alleged retaliatory acts (as pleaded) were actionable	Municipality: plaintiffs failed threshold showing because speech not protected	Held: Court did not reach full elements because plaintiffs failed the citizen-speech threshold
Whether plaintiffs alleged causation/that speech was a substantial or motivating factor	Officers: their support for the policy motivated discipline/retaliation	Municipality: absent protected speech status, causation inquiry unnecessary	Held: Because speech was unprotected, causation/retaliation elements were not satisfied and claims dismissed

Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410 (2006) (public-employee speech is protected only when speaking as a citizen, not when speaking pursuant to official duties)
Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983) (public employees’ speech rights limited where speech concerns workplace matters)
Foraker v. Chaffinch, 501 F.3d 231 (3d Cir. 2007) (speech reflecting special knowledge from job may be part of official duties)
Thomas v. Indep. Twp., 463 F.3d 285 (3d Cir. 2006) (elements of § 1983 retaliation claim for speech)
Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195 (3d Cir. 1988) (associational-retaliation standard; substantial or motivating factor test)
Gorum v. Sessoms, 561 F.3d 179 (3d Cir. 2009) (applying public-concern and citizen-speech requirements to associational claims linked to speech)
Borough of Duryea v. Guarnieri, 564 U.S. 379 (2011) (discussing interplay of public-employee speech and grievance/collective-bargaining rights)
McLaughlin v. Phelan Hallinan & Schmieg, LLP, 756 F.3d 240 (3d Cir. 2014) (standard: plenary review of dismissal on the pleadings)