Michael Johnson v. Jason Dalke
933 F.3d 871
| 7th Cir. | 2019Background
- The PLRA’s "three-strikes" rule, 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g), bars prisoners from proceeding in forma pauperis after three prior dismissals as frivolous, malicious, or for failure to state a claim; district courts use intake forms to collect litigation histories.
- Northern District of Illinois form required detailed listing of all prior cases and warned that incomplete responses could lead to dismissal.
- Fabian Greyer filed a civil-rights suit and omitted two federal cases on the form (a prior habeas petition and a contemporaneous filing); the district court dismissed his case with prejudice for fraud without explicit findings on intent or materiality.
- Michael Johnson filed a civil-rights suit and provided incomplete details about several prior suits; the district court identified additional omitted cases and dismissed his suit with prejudice for fraud, again without clear findings on materiality.
- On appeal the Seventh Circuit reviewed whether the district courts properly found fraud (requiring intent and materiality) and whether omissions were material to § 1915(g) screening.
- The Seventh Circuit vacated both dismissals and remanded, concluding the district courts’ factual findings were flawed and that the courts failed to make required materiality determinations.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether failure to fully complete litigation-history form can be sanctioned as fraud leading to dismissal with prejudice | Greyer/Johnson: omissions were inadvertent (mental illness, illiteracy, forgetfulness, contemporaneous filings); not fraudulent | District courts: omissions showed intentional deceit warranting dismissal to enforce candor and screen strikes | Court: Dismissal for fraud requires explicit findings of intent and materiality; district courts lacked adequate findings and relied on flawed factual assumptions — vacated and remanded |
| What constitutes "fraud on the court" in this context (intent requirement) | Plaintiffs: negligent, reckless, or mistaken omissions are not fraud; requires fraudulent intent | District courts: characterized omissions as intentional based on litigant histories and form warnings | Court: Fraud requires deceptive intent distinct from negligence; district courts must identify and support intent with facts before imposing extreme sanctions |
| What is materiality for omissions under § 1915(g) | Plaintiffs: omitted cases did not affect in forma pauperis eligibility (no strikes) or were outside scope | District courts: omissions were material because they showed litigation activity and possible similar claims | Court: Materiality means omission would affect the court’s screening outcome—e.g., undisclosed cases that are strikes or show significant factual overlap; omitted cases here were not material |
| Whether district courts made adequate factual findings to support dismissal with prejudice | Plaintiffs: district orders lacked findings on intent and materiality; factual errors about nature/timing of omitted cases | District courts: relied on forms, litigant histories, and perceived dishonesty to justify sanctions | Court: Orders were insufficiently reasoned and some factual premises were erroneous; vacated sanctions and remanded for correct application |
Key Cases Cited
- Hoskins v. Dart, 633 F.3d 541 (7th Cir. 2011) (dismissal with prejudice affirmed where litigant repeatedly failed to disclose multiple similar pending civil-rights suits)
- Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89 (2007) (pro se pleadings must be liberally construed)
- Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32 (1991) (courts possess inherent sanctioning authority but must exercise it with restraint)
- Law v. Siegel, 571 U.S. 415 (2014) (inherent powers subordinate to statutory limitations)
- Universal Health Servs., Inc. v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1989 (2016) (materiality focuses on effect on the likely or actual behavior of the recipient)
- Lindell v. McCallum, 352 F.3d 1107 (7th Cir. 2003) (maliciousness can be shown by repeated or overlapping claims suggesting intent to harass)
- Sloan v. Lesza, 181 F.3d 857 (7th Cir. 1999) (noting need for centralized records for § 1915(g) and addressing sanctions for nondisclosure)