Michael J. Lock v. State of Indiana, 2012 Ind. LEXIS 597

Indiana allows commuting with suspended privileges if a device’s maximum design speed does not exceed 25 mph.
Lock was stopped for 43 mph on a flat, dry surface while riding a Zuma with suspended privileges for HTV.
Trial admitted stipulations: Zuma has two wheels, engine 49 cc, engine rating ≤2 hp, automatic transmission; radar track 43 mph.
Lock was convicted of a Class D felony for operating with suspended privileges; driving privileges revoked for life; two infractions were dismissed.
Court of Appeals reversed; Indiana Supreme Court granted transfer; standard of review is sufficiency of evidence and de novo vagueness review.
Majority holds the statute is not unconstitutionally vague and the evidence was sufficient to prove a maximum design speed over 25 mph.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Is §9-30-10-16 unconstitutionally vague as applied?	Lock argues the statute lacks notice when Zuma’s capability is unknown.	State contends the statute provides notice and is constitutionally sound as applied.	Statute not unconstitutionally vague as applied.
Is the evidence sufficient to prove a maximum design speed >25 mph?	Limited evidence of speed and no design-speed proof create speculation.	Radar speed plus stipulations support maximum design speed over 25 mph.	Evidence sufficient to sustain conviction.
What is the meaning of 'maximum design speed' in this context?	Design speed refers to the maker’s intended speed, not post-sale modifications.	Statutory text should cover modifications and redesigns to the original device.	Majority adopts broader reading: includes original design speed and reasonable post-manufacturer modifications.

Brown v. State, 868 N.E.2d 464 (Ind. 2007) (due process notice in criminal statutes)
Downey, 476 N.E.2d 121 (Ind. 1985) (need for clear lines between trivial and substantial conduct)
Lombardo, 738 N.E.2d 653 (Ind. 2000) (statutory vagueness reconsiderations; ordinary-people standard)
Brady v. State, 575 N.E.2d 981 (Ind. 1991) (presumption favoring constitutionality; interpretive principles)
Drane v. State, 867 N.E.2d 144 (Ind. 2007) (standard for sufficiency review of evidence)
Cooper, 935 N.E.2d 146 (Ind. 2010) (conviction requires knowledge of suspension)
Jackson, 889 N.E.2d 819 (Ind. 2008) (knowledge element in HTV contexts)
Jenkins v. State, 726 N.E.2d 268 (Ind. 2000) (evidence sufficiency standard quoted)
Pickens v. State, 751 N.E.2d 331 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001) (inference sufficiency in sufficiency review)
Baird v. State, 955 N.E.2d 845 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011) (design-speed inferences from speed evidence)
Annis v. State, 917 N.E.2d 722 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009) (speed evidence and design capabilities)