Michael Hill v. United States, 877 F.3d 717

Michael Hill, after convictions for drug and firearms offenses, was sentenced under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), 18 U.S.C. § 924(e), based on an earlier Illinois attempted murder conviction.
Hill challenged that sentencing enhancement in a successive collateral attack authorized under 28 U.S.C. §§ 2244(b), 2255(h), arguing his prior attempted-murder conviction does not qualify as a "violent felony" under the ACCA elements clause.
Illinois attempt statute (720 ILCS 5/8-4(a)) criminalizes intent plus a substantial step; Hill argued such attempts can be committed without the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force (e.g., planning, buying a weapon).
The government did not press procedural defenses; the Seventh Circuit proceeded to the merits and examined precedent treating inchoate offenses and state murder modes.
The court adopted Judge Hamilton’s concurrence in Morris: an attempt to commit an offense that is a violent felony when completed is itself a violent felony under the ACCA elements clause.
The court also held that Illinois murder (and therefore attempted murder), including means like poisoning or exposure, involves "physical force" as defined in Johnson v. United States and thus qualifies as a violent felony.

Issue	Hill's Argument	Government's Argument	Held
Whether an attempt to commit a crime that would be a violent felony when completed qualifies as a "violent felony" under the ACCA elements clause	Attempt convictions under Illinois require only intent and a substantial step; an attempt can occur without use/attempted/threatened physical force, so attempts are not covered	An attempt requires intent to commit every element of the completed crime; if the completed crime is a violent felony, the attempt likewise implicates the elements clause	Court held: An attempt to commit an offense that would be a violent felony when completed is itself a violent felony under §924(e)(2)(B)(i) (adopting Judge Hamilton’s analysis)
Whether Illinois murder (and thus attempted murder) necessarily involves "physical force" under the ACCA elements clause	Certain modes of Illinois murder (poisoning, exposure, leaving in highway) do not involve "use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another"	"Physical force" means force capable of causing physical pain or injury (Johnson); many means of murder (poison, exposure, placing in danger) involve application of force under that definition	Court held: Illinois murder and attempted murder are categorically violent felonies because those means involve "physical force" as defined in Johnson; felony-murder rules treated same as substantive offense

Johnson v. United States, 559 U.S. 133 (2010) (defines "physical force" as force capable of causing physical pain or injury)
Castleman v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 1405 (2014) (supports broad interpretation of "physical force")
Beckles v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 886 (2017) (addressed vagueness challenges to the Sentencing Guidelines; affected prior Circuit reasoning)
United States v. Fogg, 836 F.3d 951 (8th Cir. 2016) (held attempted drive-by shooting is a violent felony)
United States v. Wade, 458 F.3d 1273 (11th Cir. 2006) (treated attempts to crimes listed in §924(e)(2)(B)(ii) as violent felonies)
United States v. Armour, 840 F.3d 904 (7th Cir. 2016) (held attempted bank robbery a crime of violence under §924(c); distinguished by presence of intimidation element)
Hill v. United States, 827 F.3d 560 (7th Cir. 2016) (held attempted murder a crime of violence under the Sentencing Guidelines; decision discussed in circuit analysis)
United States v. Raupp, 677 F.3d 756 (7th Cir. 2012) (held inchoate offenses can be crimes of violence under the Guidelines)
United States v. Waters, 823 F.3d 1062 (7th Cir. 2016) (held poisoning and withholding medicine entail use of force for categorical analysis)
In re Irby, 858 F.3d 231 (4th Cir. 2017) (concluded poisoning and similar means involve force for ACCA purposes)