Michael Fuqua v. Charles Ryan
890 F.3d 838
| 9th Cir. | 2018Background
- Fuqua, an Arizona inmate and devout Christian, was assigned to kitchen work and requested not to be scheduled on Saturdays and certain High Sabbaths (including the Feast of Trumpets).
- He submitted two letters requesting shift swaps; supervisors refused, and on the Feast of Trumpets (Sept. 24, 2014) Fuqua declined to work and was charged with "Aggravated Refusal of an Assignment."
- At a disciplinary hearing Fuqua was found guilty and received sanctions including loss of job, detention, extra duty, and loss of privileges; he appealed through the two-level disciplinary process up to the ADOC Director, who denied relief.
- Fuqua sued pro se in federal court under the First Amendment and RLUIPA (religious exercise); the district court dismissed some defendants and claims at screening and granted summary judgment to remaining defendants for failure to exhaust administrative remedies under the PLRA.
- The Ninth Circuit reversed, holding Fuqua exhausted available remedies by pursuing the disciplinary appeals (D.O. 803), because his religious-defense to the refusal charge was considered during the disciplinary process and disciplinary appeals were the only available route to redress the conviction and sanctions.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Fuqua exhausted administrative remedies by using inmate letters/grievance process (D.O. 802) | Letters sought scheduling accommodation; exhaustion satisfied or letters were ineffective given circumstances | Letters did not complete grievance process and request was moot after suspension | Not exhausted via letters; letters only sought shift changes and were mooted once Fuqua was suspended |
| Whether Fuqua exhausted by pursuing disciplinary appeals (D.O. 803) | Disciplinary appeals raised religious-defense to refusal charge and sought expungement of conviction and sanctions, thus exhausted remedies | Disciplinary process is limited to due process, sufficiency of proof, and penalties and cannot address religious accommodation claims | Exhaustion satisfied: disciplinary appeals addressed the religious-defense and could have redressed conviction and sanctions, so they were the proper and available avenue |
| Whether ADOC’s grievance procedures were "available" under PLRA (Ross availability standard) | Requiring a separate grievance would be unknowable or futile because D.O. 802 barred grievances for disciplinary matters and D.O. 904 accommodations required 30 days’ notice Fuqua lacked | Grievance process existed and Fuqua failed to use it | Remedies deemed unavailable in practice for this claim; PLRA requires exhaustion only of available remedies, so Fuqua was not required to pursue D.O. 802 in addition to D.O. 803 |
| Whether district court should reinstate defendants dismissed at screening under §1915A | N/A (Fuqua sought reinstatement) | Dismissed defendants were properly dismissed for failure to state a claim | Affirmed: dismissal of those defendants stands because complaint lacked plausible allegations against them |
Key Cases Cited
- Albino v. Baca, 747 F.3d 1162 (9th Cir. 2014) (defendants bear burden to show remedy available; prisoner must show unavailability)
- Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199 (2007) (failure-to-exhaust is an affirmative defense; defendants bear burden to plead and prove)
- Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81 (2006) (exhaustion requires compliance with an agency’s critical procedural rules)
- Ross v. Blake, 136 S. Ct. 1850 (2016) (administrative remedies are required only if they are "available"; outlines circumstances making remedies unavailable)
- Holt v. Hobbs, 135 S. Ct. 853 (2015) (RLUIPA provides broad protection for religious liberty)
- Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709 (2005) (RLUIPA limits when prisons may resist religious accommodations)
- Warsoldier v. Woodford, 418 F.3d 989 (9th Cir. 2005) (RLUIPA burden-shifting framework when substantial burden shown)
- Brown v. Valoff, 422 F.3d 926 (9th Cir. 2005) (RLUIPA incorporates PLRA exhaustion)
- Griffin v. Arpaio, 557 F.3d 1117 (9th Cir. 2009) (administrative appeals must put officials on notice of the nature of the wrong)
- Marella v. Terhune, 568 F.3d 1024 (9th Cir. 2009) (administrative remedies unavailable where inmate could not obtain required form in time)
- Nunez v. Duncan, 591 F.3d 1217 (9th Cir. 2010) (remedies unavailable where inmate lacked access to a necessary policy)
- Reyes v. Smith, 810 F.3d 654 (9th Cir. 2016) (exhaustion serves to alert prison officials and allow corrective action)