955 F.3d 725
8th Cir.2020Background
- Becton Dickinson (BD) bought cardboard boxes from Westrock; Westrock contracted XPO and Magnum to store and transport the shipment.
- After delivery, BD employee Michael Fergin opened a trailer door and a stack of boxes fell, fracturing his shoulder; Fergin sued Westrock and added a negligence claim against XPO and Magnum.
- Magnum moved for summary judgment arguing the Carmack Amendment preempted Fergin’s state-law personal injury claim; the district court granted summary judgment to Magnum applying a conduct-based preemption approach.
- The district court later held XPO was a carrier under the Carmack Amendment and granted summary judgment to XPO as well.
- The Eighth Circuit reversed, holding the Carmack Amendment does not preempt a third-party personal injury claim because the Amendment’s text limits recovery to the person entitled under the bill of lading and to property loss; the case was remanded.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the Carmack Amendment preempts a third-party personal-injury claim arising from a shipment | Fergin: not a party to bill of lading; claim is for personal injury, not property loss; Carmack therefore inapplicable | Defendants: Carmack’s preemptive scope has been expanded by case law; under a conduct-based approach claims causally tied to carrier conduct during transport are preempted | Court: Reversed district court; Carmack text confines liability to parties to bill of lading and property injury; Supreme Court precedent has not extended Carmack to third-party personal injuries; claim not preempted |
Key Cases Cited
- Adams Express Co. v. Croninger, 226 U.S. 491 (1913) (established that Carmack preempts state law for parties to a bill of lading concerning property loss)
- Southeastern Express Co. v. Pastime Amusement Co., 299 U.S. 28 (1936) (describes Carmack as covering damages from failures in transportation to agreed destination, in context of property/delay claims)
- New York, Philadelphia, & Norfolk R.R. v. Peninsula Produce Exchange, 240 U.S. 34 (1916) (earlier articulation of Carmack’s breadth regarding property damages)
- Chicago, Rock Island & Pac. Ry. Co. v. Maucher, 248 U.S. 359 (1919) (held Carmack deals with shipment of property and does not create a federal question for personal injury claims)
- Fulton v. Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific R.R., 481 F.2d 326 (8th Cir. 1973) (involved property damage; language on scope is dicta when applied to third-party personal injuries)
- Passmore v. Astrue, 533 F.3d 658 (8th Cir. 2008) (definition of dicta and its non-precedential status)
- GEICO Cas. Co. v. Isaacson, 932 F.3d 721 (8th Cir. 2019) (remand appropriate when district court did not rule on an issue presented)