Michael Fenwick v. United States, 414 U.S. App. D.C. 179

Background

In Jan. 2007, 16-year-old Michael Fenwick fled officers in a parking lot; his car clipped Deputy Pudimott’s side mirror as he drove toward the exit and Pudimott was struck.
Deputies Pudimott and Fischer fired on Fenwick, hitting him four times; Deputy Mickle did not fire.
Fenwick was adjudicated (juvenile proceeding) of armed assault on Pudimott based on driving that created a "grave risk of causing significant bodily injury." The D.C. Court of Appeals affirmed that a moving car can be a dangerous weapon when used to escape.
Fenwick sued the deputies under Bivens for excessive deadly force (Fourth Amendment). Deputies moved for summary judgment asserting collateral estoppel/Heck and qualified immunity; district court granted judgment for Mickle but denied summary judgment for Pudimott and Fischer, finding factual issues on whether the shooting occurred after the threat had passed.
The D.C. Circuit reversed as to Pudimott and Fischer, holding the deputies entitled to qualified immunity because controlling Supreme Court precedent (especially Brosseau) left the Fourth Amendment question not clearly established in these circumstances.

Issues

Issue	Fenwick's Argument	Deputies' Argument	Held
Qualified immunity for deadly force	Deputiffs violated clearly established Fourth Amendment rights by firing after threat had passed	Deputies claim qualified immunity because law did not clearly prohibit shooting a fleeing driver who had just endangered an officer	Held: Qualified immunity applies — officers had no fair notice their conduct was unlawful given Supreme Court precedent (Brosseau)
Effect of juvenile adjudication (Heck / collateral estoppel)	Fenwick argued adjudication did not preclude his excessive-force claim	Deputies argued adjudication precluded relitigation of facts necessary to that judgment and barred Bivens damages that would imply its invalidity	Held: Adjudication precluded only aspects necessarily decided (e.g., that Fenwick’s driving had endangered Pudimott); it did not bar the excessive-force claim entirely because success on some Fourth Amendment theories would not necessarily invalidate the adjudication
Whether officers’ use of deadly force violated the Fourth Amendment on these facts	Fenwick: shooting was unreasonable if done after danger to Pudimott had passed	Deputies: shooting was reasonable to prevent flight and protect officers/bystanders given prior dangerous driving	Held: Court did not decide the constitutional question definitively; instead resolved on clearly established-law ground — not clearly established that force was unlawful here
Controlling precedent and its application	Fenwick: Brosseau and other cases do not justify these shootings; post‑Brosseau authority established unlawfulness	Deputies: Brosseau (and Supreme Court cases) leave officers in the “hazy border” and support immunity; Plumhoff and other cases support reasonableness	Held: Brosseau controls the qualified-immunity inquiry; no controlling or robust consensus case made the unlawfulness clear at the time

Key Cases Cited

Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (establishing damages action against federal officials for constitutional violations)
Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (damages action barred if success would necessarily imply invalidity of conviction)
Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194 (two-step qualified-immunity framework; clearly established right inquiry)
Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (deadly force may only be used when suspect poses threat of serious physical harm)
Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372 (video evidence governs how courts view facts on summary judgment)
Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194 (officer entitled to qualified immunity where conduct falls in hazy border between excessive and acceptable force)
Plumhoff v. Rickard, 134 S. Ct. 2012 (officers’ use of deadly force during dangerous flight may be reasonable; courts should consider totality and threat to public safety)