Michael Easley v. City of Riverside, 890 F.3d 851

Background

On Dec. 22, 2011, Officer Silvio Macias shot Michael Easley three times after a traffic stop; Easley suffered permanent injuries and sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for excessive force (Fourth Amendment).
During pursuit Easley clutched his waistband, removed an object (later determined to be a gun) with his left hand and threw it to his left; Macias shot him within a short span (Easley estimated 2–4 seconds).
Macias pleaded qualified immunity in his answer but did not move for summary judgment; the district court sua sponte ordered an evidentiary hearing on qualified immunity and later granted summary judgment for Macias.
The district court found no genuine material fact dispute and concluded Macias’ use of deadly force was objectively reasonable; plaintiffs appealed.
The Ninth Circuit majority affirmed, holding the district court properly raised qualified immunity sua sponte and that, viewing the evidence in Easley’s favor, a reasonable officer could have believed deadly force was necessary.
Judge Pratt dissented, arguing the court improperly resolved credibility and material factual disputes (timing, whether Macias saw the gun profile, whether Easley faced the officer) that should have gone to a jury, so summary judgment was improper.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the district court could raise qualified immunity sua sponte	Easley argued procedural error and that Macias waived the defense by not moving for summary judgment	Macias had pleaded qualified immunity and preserved the defense when the court directed briefing	Affirmed: courts may raise qualified immunity sua sponte if party had notice and the defense was pleaded
Whether Macias is entitled to qualified immunity on excessive-force claim	Easley: genuine disputes of material fact (timing, line-of-sight, whether he faced/aimed at officer) preclude summary judgment	Macias: facts (partner shouted “Gun,” Easley grabbed waistband and threw object, shots fired within seconds) support objective reasonableness	Majority: Qualified immunity applies—officer could reasonably fear imminent deadly threat; summary judgment proper
Whether the law was clearly established so that a reasonable officer would know force was unlawful	Easley: precedent (Graham, Garner, Curnow) put officer on notice; disputed facts could show unarmed suspect shot after discarding gun	Macias: split-second assessment doctrine and precedent support immunity under these facts	Majority: did not reach full established-law analysis because second-prong dispositive; found force objectively reasonable; dissent disagreed
Whether disputed facts were material and for a jury	Easley: timing and what Macias objectively perceived are material and disputed; credibility should not be resolved on summary judgment	Macias: testimony and video evidence support his account and negate triable issues	Majority: viewed evidence in plaintiff’s favor but concluded no genuine issue as a matter of law; Dissent: genuine triable issues exist and remand required

Key Cases Cited

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (procedural limits on sua sponte summary judgment; losing party must have notice)
Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223 (qualified immunity two-prong framework; courts may choose order of analysis)
Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (Fourth Amendment reasonableness test for force)
Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (deadly force to prevent escape unreasonable unless suspect poses immediate threat)
Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194 (qualified immunity in deadly-force context)
Kisela v. Hughes, 138 S. Ct. 1148 (deference to split-second judgments; qualified immunity where officer had mere seconds)
Wilkinson v. Torres, 610 F.3d 546 (9th Cir. discussion of deadly-force reasonableness standard)
Curnow ex rel. Curnow v. Ridgecrest Police, 952 F.2d 321 (9th Cir. case finding deadly force unreasonable where suspect was not pointing gun when shot)
Longoria v. Pinal Cty., 873 F.3d 699 (9th Cir. summary-judgment standard when qualified immunity is asserted)