Michael Earl Lane v. State
10-15-00036-CR
| Tex. App. | Dec 17, 2015Background
- Michael Earl Lane was convicted in Navarro County for aggravated sexual assault; he appealed challenging sufficiency of evidence, exclusion of certain impeachment evidence, and the jury charge.
- Victim K.C. reported being forced behind a building at knife-point, restrained, and sexually assaulted; she described the assailant as a Black male, ~25–30 years old, 5'8"–5'10", wearing a black shirt and jean shorts, and said he was Paul Moore’s nephew.
- K.C. could not identify Lane in a photo lineup or in court, but she told officers the assailant was Moore’s nephew; Lane encountered officers at the scene and matched the dispatched description and identified himself as Moore’s nephew.
- Forensic testing matched sperm from K.C.’s vaginal swab to Lane and indicated he was the last to deposit semen.
- Lane’s defense was that the sexual contact was consensual and part of a pattern where K.C. traded sex for drugs; he introduced witnesses who placed him at locations and recounted threats by K.C. to accuse others of rape when upset about drugs.
- At a pretrial Rule 412 hearing, the trial court excluded testimony about specific prior sexual acts (sex-for-drugs) as cumulative, but allowed evidence that K.C. had been angry and threatened to accuse others; Lane did not request a limiting instruction when extraneous-offense evidence was admitted.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (State) | Defendant's Argument (Lane) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1. Sufficiency of the evidence to prove identity and nonconsent | DNA linking Lane as last person to deposit semen, victim’s description and statements, and circumstantial evidence support a rational jury verdict | Victim could not identify attacker in lineup or court; sex was consensual and motivated by drugs | Court: Evidence sufficient; jury could infer Lane was the assailant and resolve credibility against Lane; issue overruled |
| 2. Exclusion of evidence that victim exchanged sex for drugs | Such testimony (specific prior sexual acts) is barred by Rule 412 and was cumulative of admitted evidence about motive/bias; probative value outweighed by risk of delay/prejudice | Excluding specifics deprived Lane of showing motive/bias and impeachment relevant to consent and truthfulness | Court: No abuse of discretion; trial court reasonably excluded cumulative sex-for-drugs evidence while allowing threats and other impeachment; issue overruled |
| 3. Jury instruction limiting extraneous-offense evidence to impeachment purposes | Once defendant opened the door by testifying about his history and did not request a Rule 105 limiting instruction, extraneous-offense evidence properly became general evidence | Trial court erred by allowing extraneous-offense evidence under Rule 404(b) when it was only admissible under Rule 609 for impeachment; jury should have been limited to credibility use | Court: No error; defendant failed to request limiting instruction when evidence was admitted, so no charge obligation; issue overruled |
Key Cases Cited
- Lucio v. State, 351 S.W.3d 878 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011) (standard for reviewing sufficiency of the evidence under Jackson)
- Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (U.S. 1979) (reasonable-doubt sufficiency standard for criminal convictions)
- Hooper v. State, 214 S.W.3d 9 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (circumstantial evidence can be sufficient to support conviction)
- Conner v. State, 67 S.W.3d 192 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001) (appellate review considers properly and improperly admitted evidence)
- Chambers v. State, 805 S.W.2d 459 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991) (factfinder credibility determinations entitled to deference)
- Malik v. State, 953 S.W.2d 234 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997) (definition of a hypothetically correct jury charge for sufficiency review)
- Martinez v. State, 327 S.W.3d 727 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) (abuse-of-discretion standard for evidentiary rulings)
- Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308 (U.S. 1974) (Confrontation Clause limits on excluding impeachment evidence)
- Hammer v. State, 296 S.W.3d 555 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009) (limits on attacking a witness's general truthfulness via specific instances)
- Delgado v. State, 235 S.W.3d 244 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (trial judge not required to give limiting instruction later if defendant did not request one when evidence admitted)