Michael E. Steele v. Rayellen Jarrell Milburn, Individually and as Independent of the Estate of Mary King Steele, 10-13-00426-CV

Mary King Steele's will named Rayellen Milburn sole child and independent executor, gifted Milburn personalty, and created exempt and nonexempt testamentary trusts for each of three children, including two trusts for Michael E. Steele.
The will directed that certain gifts be held in trust (not distributed outright) and appointed Milburn trustee; if she ceased, Steele, Sheila Howard, and Frost Bank were named co-trustees.
Milburn, Howard, and Frost initially declined the co-trusteeship; Steele accepted in November 2013 and Comerica Bank later accepted, making the co-trusteeship effective in March 2014.
Steele sued (Sept. 17, 2013) seeking an accounting and distribution from Milburn under former Probate Code §149B (now Estates Code §405.001), alleging delayed administration.
Milburn filed a plea to the jurisdiction asserting Steele lacked standing because he was not an “interested person” in the estate under former Probate Code §3(r) (now Estates Code §22.018) because the will devised property to trusts rather than to Steele individually.
The trial court granted the plea and dismissed Steele; on appeal the Tenth Court of Appeals reviewed jurisdiction de novo.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether Steele is an “interested person” with standing to sue the executor for accounting/distribution	Steele: named testamentary-trust beneficiary and later co-trustee; has a vested equitable property interest in the trusts and thus a justiciable interest in estate administration	Milburn: the will devises to trusts (not to Steele individually), so Steele is not a beneficiary of the estate and lacks standing; claims should be brought by trustees, not trust beneficiaries	Court held Steele is an interested person: as a named testamentary-trust beneficiary he has a property right in the estate via the trusts and thus standing; also has standing in his co-trustee capacity. Trial court dismissal reversed and case remanded.

IT-Davy, 74 S.W.3d 849 (Tex. 2002) (jurisdictional questions reviewed de novo)
Brunson v. Woolsey, 63 S.W.3d 583 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2001) (standing is component of subject-matter jurisdiction)
Texas Ass’n of Bus. v. Texas Air Control Bd., 852 S.W.2d 440 (Tex. 1993) (standing requires a real controversy and justiciable interest)
Abbott v. Foy, 662 S.W.2d 629 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1983) (definition of person interested in estate: legally ascertained pecuniary interest affected by probate)
Nootsie, Ltd. v. Williamson County Appraisal Dist., 925 S.W.2d 659 (Tex. 1996) (distinguishing standing from capacity)
Austin Nursing Ctr., Inc. v. Lovato, 171 S.W.3d 845 (Tex. 2005) (standing focuses on justiciable interest)
Board of Water Engineers v. City of San Antonio, 283 S.W.2d 722 (Tex. 1955) (real controversy requirement for standing)